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## Democracy as Understood by Thomas Jefferson

Immortality is the reward of those who, like Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton, identify themselves with principles that do not die. The character acquires the undying nature of his ideals. As long as conservatism maintains a following in these United States, the soul of Alexander Hamilton goes marching on. Equally, while the democratic principle persists, Jefferson holds aloft the torch of freedom. Neither the conservatism of Hamilton nor the liberalism of Jefferson is a static ideal. Both suffer a sea change into something rich and rare. But in some form they do persist, and each statesman has thus acquired an immortality which even utmost talents would have missed or forfeited had they been identified with more ephemeral interests.

Jefferson the democrat still lives, therefore, however far his followers may wander from the patterns of democracy which were to him inevitable. For Jefferson was as certainly as lesser men the child of time and place. The eighteenth century had its peculiar flavor, and the patriarchal state of a Virginia country gentleman determined the locale. The Squire of Monticello, born to freedom and cherishing it intensely, would not and could not define his first love in the same terms as could and would Jean Jacques Rousseau copying music in a Parisian garret.

Quite conceivably Thomas Jefferson in his Virginia manor house might have developed the philosophy of George William Fairfax or other Tory neighbors, but if he turned toward freedom, as of course he did, it must be to the spacious freedom of a landsman, uncrowded by neighbors, remote from the mobs of cities, suspicious of mankind in the mass but trusting joyously in man's possibilities for improvement as an individual. In short,

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EDITOR'S NOTE. This paper was read at the meeting of the Mississippi Valley Historical Association in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, April 25, 1941.

time, and more especially place, predetermined Jefferson to be the prophet of the free individual, the creator of a free state not its creature.

The state envisioned by the democrat of Jefferson's day was an instrumentality for the guaranty of political freedom and, through its patronage of education, for the enlargement of the personalities of its constituents. Thus it could not ignore entirely the responsibilities assumed by the modern socialized state, but its emphasis was consistently political.

Certainly Jefferson in prewar Virginia could not be expected to develop any large awareness of the problems presented to modern society by extremes of wealth and poverty. His own community had passed from the poverty of the frontier, which was incidentally the nursery and proving ground of individual survival values, into the modest prosperity of an agricultural economy wherein such wealth as had accumulated was on the whole equitably distributed, that is among the white men of Jefferson's time and place. Slavery was a problem, it is true, in the minds of Quakers, Moravians, and certain individual enthusiasts, and Jefferson was not indifferent to its social implications, but he never did conceive of liberty in terms of the black man. His vision of freedom, at least in his earlier years, was American freedom from British interference, and the Declaration of Independence, Jefferson's supreme expression of his earlier philosophy, remains a highlight of political rather than of social democracy.

The catalogue of grievances, which Jefferson assembles in masterly fashion as warrant for the severing of ancient ties, contains not one item among its twenty-seven separate grounds for protest that modern democrats would regard as social. Jefferson's indignation is aroused by the failure of King George to govern fairly and efficiently, or, failing this, to give the colonists more leeway in their own administration. His abuse of the judiciary, his multiplication of office holders, his quartering of standing armies upon an unwilling populace, his levying of taxes without consent—these are among the iniquities of the British king. But not a hint is here (why should there be?) of social change within Virginia or any other colony. Freedom is the sole objective, freedom from the political tyranny of an unsympathetic administrator. So far the democracy of Thomas Jefferson was confined to the political.

In the ensuing Revolution, Jefferson's part remained more

ideological than practical, save for his war governorship of his native state, which unhappily coincided with Arnold's treason and subsequent invasion of Virginia. Jefferson was forced to flee much as Madison fled Washington a generation later. The humiliation thus endured seared his very soul while at the same time it furnished ammunition for his political opponents then and later. It appreciably intensified his hatred for the Mother Country, confirming him still more definitively as a political revolutionist. Nor did subsequent adventures erase this prejudice. A brief tour of duty in England as minister left no such impression upon Jefferson as a previous sojourn had left with Franklin. So that it may be affirmed quite safely that the reaction of Great Britain upon Jefferson achieved not only its preliminary but virtually its final expression in political democracy.

For the extent that Jefferson ever became a social democrat, French influences more than British are responsible. The residence in Paris that cost him any major participation (save in some degree by correspondence) in the Constitutional Convention, deprived him of a share in a state paper which was as obviously as the Declaration of Independence a political document. It exposed him somewhat more directly to those broader revolutionary currents which gave the Revolution its immense historical significance. But even here, his personal acquaintance with the movement was limited to its earlier and bourgeois phases.

Before the lower orders obtained control, Jefferson was back at home as Secretary of State, and his communications with his successor, William Short, so well beloved that Short has been described as Jefferson's "adopted son," betray an irritable unwillingness to accept Short's descriptions of a movement that had succumbed to mob direction. Jefferson had no use for mobs, and he was unwilling to believe that so auspicious a beginning could degenerate so rapidly.

The high moment for Jefferson in the French Revolution was an evening in 1789 when Lafayette invited himself and seven friends to dine with him in the hope of drinking from the pure fount of democratic wisdom. In his *Autobiography*, written many years afterward, at the age of seventy-seven, Jefferson summarizes the occasion:

The discussions began at the hour of four, and were continued till ten o'clock in the evening, during which time I was a silent witness to a coolness and candor of argument unusual in the conflicts of

political opinion; to a logical reasoning, and chaste eloquence, disfigured by no gaudy tinsel of rhetoric or declamation, and truly worthy of being placed in parallel with the finest dialogues of antiquity, as handed to us by Xenophon, by Plato and Cicero. The result was an agreement that the king should have a suspensive veto on the laws, that the legislature should be composed of a single body only, and that to be chosen by the people. This Concordate decided the fate of the constitution.<sup>1</sup>

Here as elsewhere Jefferson is a political scientist far more than an economist. To be sure he goes on to say that this arrangement will overthrow the aristocracy but there is no evidence even here that he regarded such a transformation as other than political.<sup>2</sup>

But if his British and French contacts reenforced his political democracy, one development within his native land turned Jefferson's thinking into channels more consistent with what we today might call social democracy. Even here the dividing line is not clear-cut. I refer to the Order of the Cincinnati. It was inevitable that veterans of the Revolutionary War should organize into a society to perpetuate the memories of camp and field. In this case it was the officers who formed the organization, and it was inevitable that they choose General Washington as their first president. The society was constituted on the principle of primogeniture, which to the radical or liberal mind of the day conveyed dark implications of an hereditary aristocracy awarding to itself permanent pensions and feeding henceforth at the public crib.

Before Washington accepted an honor fraught with such objections, he appealed to various friends, including Jefferson, for a candid opinion upon the proprieties involved. This was Jefferson's opportunity for a measured but eloquent expression of democracy in which, without attempting to dictate Washington's sentiments, he presented a cumulative list of objections.<sup>3</sup> Washington seems to have felt the cogency of Jefferson's arguments, but he could not dictate the entire proceedings of the Order and regardless of complete approval, it was inevitable that he accept the proffered honor. In the perspective of history the whole affair assumes the proportions of a teapot tempest.

In the "ministry of all the talents" assembled by George

<sup>1</sup> Paul Leicester Ford, Ed., *The Works of Thomas Jefferson*, New York, 1905, I, 154-155.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, IV, 323-329.



Washington in his naïve assumption that all good men would think alike, Jefferson quickly found himself the chief dissenter. Pitting himself against the centralizing tendencies of Alexander Hamilton, whose theories of government were fashioned on the British model, Jefferson soon found himself the leader of an opposition party, whose rise does not concern the present paper beyond recognition that it was based primarily on a concept of democracy that kept government as close to the individual citizen as might be, with a minimum of authority delegated to the national administration.

Thus more than ever Jefferson became ideologically the patron of individualism in democracy. Beyond a steady opposition to Hamilton and all his works, and the more or less subterranean organization of a party cemented by an unwearied correspondence with men like-minded with himself, Jefferson gave the major expression to this individualistic democracy in the Kentucky Resolution of 1798, which remains his most formal contribution to the states' rights theory.

If social democracy is taken in its modern meaning, the Kentucky Resolution is a purely political document. Article One of the Federal Constitution declares that "to this compact each State acceded as a State, and is an integral party, its co-States forming as to itself, the other party: That the government created by this compact was not made the exclusive or final judge of the extent of the powers delegated to itself; since that would have made its discretion, and not the Constitution, the measure of its powers; but that as in all other cases of compact among parties having no common Judge, *each party has an equal right to judge for itself, as well of infractions as of the mode and measure of redress.*"<sup>4</sup>

In this article alone is adumbrated the entire philosophy of the secession movement. Successive articles are equally constitutional or political, and it is difficult to accept the verdict of historians imbued with the socioeconomic philosophies of our own day that the Resolution is "not so much a constitutional as a social philosophy."<sup>5</sup> Definitions vary, but if political democracy has any meaning whatsoever as distinct from social democracy, then the Kentucky Resolution is political, and is evidence that as late as 1798, Jefferson's democracy was essentially political.

<sup>4</sup> Henry Steele Commager, Ed., *Documents of American History*, New York, 1935, 178-179.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

His concern in 1776 was freedom from Great Britain. His concern in 1798 was freedom from an encroaching federal government.

But the modern social historian may be permitted his own definitions. The Kentucky Resolution and its Virginia counterpart had undoubtedly social consequences. In themselves political, they carried the germs of the secession movement, many of whose aspects, of course, were social, as Jefferson was destined in due time to see. For his old age beheld the convulsions that terminated in the Missouri Compromise when, as he reported, he heard an "alarum bell" ringing in the night. Jefferson, the political philosopher, foresaw political convulsion from which a true social revolution was destined to emerge. If the American Revolution was predominantly political, the Civil War was predominantly social. Thomas Jefferson reached the halfway point between.

In his term as President, Jefferson confronted the active functioning of democracy. Official responsibility imposed a compromise with theory, and not only the Louisiana Purchase but even the enforcement of the commercial restrictions culminating in the embargo of 1808 were accompanied by a dramatic extension of the federal authority. Ideology confronting practical necessity involved Jefferson in various inconsistencies. How far the compulsion of events deflected him from *a priori* theory is open to conjecture. That it had some influence can scarcely be denied. Responsibility inevitably sobers. That his term in office actually reversed the thinking of a lifetime is not susceptible of proof. For a doctrinaire Jefferson became a surprisingly competent administrator. But doctrinaire he could do no other than remain, for he was always a philosopher at heart.

In the autumn of his life Jefferson erected, as he had been unable to erect in the busy years preceding, a philosophy fully mellowed, which aimed at perfection, as no philosophy worthy of the name can fail to aim. In this its finished form, Jefferson's philosophy conceived of life in terms of the individual. The individual was to attain his fullest stature through the medium of education, and Jefferson, who more than others had sponsored the land-grant clauses in the Ordinance of 1787, endowing for all time to come, as then was hoped, education in the Northwest Territory, was in retirement to establish the University of Virginia as the keystone of his arch for the attainment of perfection, personal and social.

Let him tell his own story in that inimitable correspondence

with John Adams in which the two old friends, reunited after long misunderstanding, found in old age the sweetness of a perfect reconciliation. Offsetting the tediousness of age, Jefferson rejoices,

I am fortunately mounted on a hobby, which, indeed, I should have better managed some thirty or forty years ago; but whose easy amble is still sufficient to give exercise and amusement to an octogenary rider. This is the establishment of a University, on a scale more comprehensive, and in a country more healthy and central than our old William and Mary, which these obstacles have long kept in a state of languor and inefficiency. But the tardiness with which such works proceed, may render it doubtful whether I shall live to see it go into action.<sup>6</sup>

This in 1823. Two years later and with death not distant, Jefferson wrote another friend, "Withdrawn by age from all other public services and attention to public things, I am closing the last scenes of life by fashioning and fostering an establishment for the instruction of those who are to come after us. I hope its influence on their virtue, freedom, fame and happiness, will be salutary and permanent."<sup>7</sup>

Probably the richest correspondence in American literature, the inimitable exchange between Jefferson and Adams in the sunset of their lives, affords an insight for which posterity is grateful into the philosophy of each. Jeffersonian democracy reaches its final and complete expression in these polished communications to his ancient friend, and if a choice is possible amid such riches, the palm belongs to the famous letter on aristocracy, dated from Monticello on October 28, 1813, in which Jefferson finds the true function of democracy to lie in affording a testing and proving ground for the only true aristocracy, the community of the best of which our race is capable.

Passing by man's command of animal reproduction in which selection leads to ever better breeds, Jefferson admits the impossibility of applying similar methods to man himself. Moreover, strength of body, the ancient measurement of aristocracy, has not survived the use of gunpowder. Wealth and birth, of course, are out for they are wholly artificial standards. Indeed, it is a major function of the state to separate the false from the true in aristocracy. In the accomplishment of this it is advisable to discount the importance of historic families and the dead hand

<sup>6</sup> Ford, *Works of Thomas Jefferson*, XII, 313, October 12, 1823.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, XII, 408, April 3, 1825.

of tradition—a point in which, thinks Jefferson, Virginia is more truly democratic than are Massachusetts and Connecticut, where the ancient families have acquired a dangerous ascendancy. Correspondingly, Virginia is more free than New England from the shackles of ecclesiastical tyranny. The Virginia clergy, secure in their fat livings, have never troubled to secure any genuine influence among the people. The same was true of landed aristocracy. The great landed families made the fundamental political mistake of paying court to royal governors for a seat in the King's Council, and now, thanks to Jefferson himself, through the abolition of entails, they have lost the means to perpetuate their wealth. Equally effective as a blow to artificial aristocracy were the other major laws of Jefferson's sponsoring, the abolition of primogeniture and the division of landed estates equally among the heirs, in the absence of a will.

These were blows at pseudo-aristocracy. On the constructive side, the encouragement of true aristocracy, Jefferson had projected a plan which unfortunately was not adopted. By means of an educational system completely subsidized by the state, all children should be exposed to the rudiments of knowledge. But a weeding process would be accomplished by a series of hurdles, which only the superior might surmount. The final hurdle would insure a completely free education to the genuine aristocrats of the mind who had the capacity to drink from the deepest wells of knowledge.

Thus, in Jefferson's own summary,

The law for religious freedom, which made a part of this system, having put down the aristocracy of the clergy, and restored to the citizen the freedom of the mind, and those of entails and descents nurturing an equality of condition among them, this on education would have raised the mass of the people to the high ground of moral respectability necessary to their own safety, and to orderly government; and would have completed the great object of qualifying them to select the veritable *aristoi*, for the trusts of government, to the exclusion of the pseudalists.<sup>8</sup>

Here, in this ripe expression of a completed philosophy, Jefferson blends the social with the individual. He will utilize education as a social force aimed primarily at the development of the individual—that superior individual who is simultaneously the outcome, the protector, and the transformer of society.

Thus we may leave him. Jefferson, the apostle of democracy,

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<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, XI, 341-350, especially 347.

sought freedom first, freedom for the state against the foreign tyrant, freedom for the citizen against the encroachment of the state. So far the political democrat. But democracy did not stop there. The citizen must be secure in his development and qualified to choose his natural leaders. For the accomplishment of this the aid of social progress was invoked. Humbling the clergy, subduing intrenched aristocrats, separating chaff from wheat, Jefferson was in some sense a social democrat as well. True, he was never confronted with the social pressures of the expanding industrial revolution, and it is a mockery for the socialist state to erect monuments to a philosopher of individual freedom. Yet, who knows? In another age Jefferson might have fashioned a philosophy upon different patterns.

LOUIS MARTIN SEARS

Purdue University



## Edward L. Doheny and the Beginnings of Petroleum Development in Mexico

Twenty years ago, on December 6, 1921, here in Chicago, a distinguished looking man about sixty-five years of age with graying hair and full white mustache was addressing the American Petroleum Institute in its second annual convention. As he began his long speech he said:

Owing to the comparatively recent discovery and development of oil in Mexico, it is justifiable, in judging its future, to give close consideration to the history of its past. For me to write such a history a largely personal narrative seems unavoidable.<sup>1</sup>

This statement sounds like the more or less pardonable vanity of a self-made business man. But during the first quarter of this century when Edward L. Doheny was interested in Mexican oil, he was the leading figure in the business. Curiously enough he went into Mexico at the height of foreign domination of the business life of that country, and he came out just as that supremacy, at least in oil, was for the first time being seriously threatened. From the moment his first Mexican well began to flow in 1901 to the time when he sold out his interests there in 1925, this lucky Irish-American prospector, who had once peddled crude petroleum from door to door to the amusement of Los Angeles,<sup>2</sup> controlled at all times the largest share of the Mexican oil business. Insofar as the beginnings of this industry can be said to have revolved around one man, that man was Edward Laurence Doheny.<sup>3</sup>

Doheny was trained for outdoor work by four years (1872-1876) in the government surveying service, following graduation from his hometown high school at Fond du Lac, Wisconsin.

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<sup>1</sup> Edward L. Doheny, "History and Future of the Oil Industry in Mexico," in *Mexican Petroleum*, Pan American Petroleum and Transport Company, New York, 1922, 13.

<sup>2</sup> Frank Hanighen and Anton Zischka, *The Secret War: The War for Oil*, London, 1935, 31.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 129. Also, interviews with Herbert G. Wylie, September 8 and 11, 1941, in Los Angeles, and Anton Zischka, *La Lucha por el Petróleo*, Mexico City, n. d., 146.

He caught the fever of the Black Hills gold rush in 1876, but government restrictions kept him out of that land. So he turned to a prospecting venture in the San Juan mountain country of Colorado, which was cut short by an early winter. From here Doheny moved on to Prescott, Arizona, and to fourteen eventful years (1876-1890) as a gold hunter in the wilds of the southwest. Of robust nature, he took this period of development in his stride. His experiences there are part of the boom history of such camps as Bradshaw, Cave Creek, Tonto Basin, Globe, and Tombstone. In these years he needed little and he had little. In his own words, fifty dollars a year saw him through, with game plentiful and salt cheap. Yet he had many friends, for, later, old-timers of the Southwest were frequently amazed to find in Doheny, the world-famous oil operator, "that wild young Irishman" of their early companionship. Among these old-timers was one who became Doheny's lifelong friend and frequent business partner, C. A. Canfield, who in 1885 took a lease on the Mount Chief Mine in Kingston, New Mexico, owned by Doheny. In 1887 Doheny entered old Mexico for the first time looking for gold and silver, but a little later he returned to New Mexico and tried his hand at schoolteaching, which proved to be no bonanza either. Then enforced inactivity caused by a serious accident led him to study law. He was admitted to the bar of New Mexico and actually practiced law for about a year (1889-1890). To his exceptional ability in mathematics and his growing interest in geology he thus added a legal training which was to stand him in good stead. Mining was still his first love, however, and so, early in 1891 he turned west to try his luck in San Bernardino County, California.<sup>4</sup>

While on his way a chance meeting with his old friend Canfield resulted in the formation of the Pacific Gold and Silver

<sup>4</sup> Interview with Frank R. Seaver, former sales manager of the Doheny interests in Mexico and intimate friend of Doheny, Los Angeles, September 11, 1941; "Interview with Mr. E. L. Doheny, April 20, 1918," in the E. L. Doheny Research Fund Papers, File K, 10912, Interview 503, Occidental College Library; *Los Angeles Times*, September 9, 1935; *Investigation of Mexican Affairs*, Senate Document No. 285, 66 Cong., 2 Sess., Washington, 1920, I, 208 (hereinafter cited as *I. M. A.*); Ezequiel Ordóñez, "El Petróleo en México," *Revista Mexicana de Ingeniería y Arquitectura*, X, No. 3 (March 15, 1932), 152-153; *Who's Who in California, 1928-1929*, San Francisco, 1929, 55; *Who's Who in the Pacific Southwest*, Los Angeles, 1913, 119; *The National Cyclopaedia of American Biography*, New York, 1930, Current Volume A, 499-500; *Press Reference Library (Southwest Edition)*, Los Angeles, 1912, 355; Caspar Whitney, *Charles Adelbert Canfield*, New York (privately printed), 1930, 69.

Extracting Company,<sup>5</sup> one of many ventures in which these two men were associated until Canfield's death twenty-two years later.<sup>6</sup> But this enterprise of 1891 does not appear to have been very successful, for Doheny was often in arrears on his Los Angeles hotel bill.<sup>7</sup>

While sitting in front of his hotel one day, Doheny saw a wagon pass by loaded with a dark tar-like earth. He ran after it to ask the Negro driver what he was hauling. The driver answered that it was *brea* from the Westlake Park district to be used as fuel in an ice-plant. An inspection of the Westlake district, the famous Brea pits of Los Angeles, which have yielded many Pleistocene fossil pieces, convinced Doheny that he had found a new kind of "gold mine." A hurried call brought Canfield from the mines and another inspection led to the enterprise that was to develop into the great California oil industry of today. Failing to lease El Rancho de la Brea, Canfield and Doheny located a shaft on a lot purchased by them at the corner of West and Patton streets, near another oil seepage discovered by Doheny. By primitive mining methods they brought in their first well on November 4, 1892. They struck oil at 165 feet, a trickle of only seven barrels a day, which they pumped by hand and sold for about two dollars a barrel.<sup>8</sup> Thus began the development of the Los Angeles oil field,<sup>9</sup> which quickly overshadowed the small

<sup>5</sup> Whitney, *Canfield*, 106-107; others of the company were M. M. Morrison, president, J. A. Chanslor, vice-president, Doheny, secretary, and J. B. Rentchler, treasurer.

<sup>6</sup> Canfield died on August 15, 1913, *ibid.*, 147. Concerning this relationship Canfield's son-in-law and biographer, Whitney, later wrote, perhaps too enthusiastically: "Such was the beginning of the business association of these two men, so different in their respective temperaments, so masterful each in his way and field: Mr. Canfield, the balance wheel of sound, unclouded judgment and ripe experience and deep understanding, whose widely established trustworthiness helped them to borrow large sums in those difficult years of the second phase of the Mexican venture on an extended scale; Mr. Doheny of marked business acumen and mining lore, shrewd and energetic, the dynamic general in the field. They appeared so fittingly to complement one another in the immense and daring enterprises upon which they subsequently embarked." *Ibid.*, 107-108.

<sup>7</sup> H. R. Wagner to Fritz L. Hoffmann, June 2, 1941. The hotel was run by W. H. Nimocks, former owner of the *Minneapolis Tribune*.

<sup>8</sup> Their methods were so primitive that they almost met death when part of the shafts caved in. They used a typical miner's shaft about six feet by four feet, timbered solidly with a partition separating ladder and bucket-way. They dug with pick and shovel and hoisted dirt by means of a small horse hitched to a rope running over a pulley. The horse was led by Canfield's eleven year old son. *Id.* to *id.*, June 2, 1941; Ordóñez, *loc. cit.*, 153; Whitney, 109-111, 151; *National Cyclopedia*, Current Volume A, 499.

<sup>9</sup> In all Doheny was responsible finally for 81 wells in the Los Angeles field whose aggregate production reached 350,000 barrels; *Los Angeles Times*, September 9, 1935.

and rather localized petroleum industry in adjoining Ventura County.<sup>10</sup>

There were still a few years of uncertainty owing to the problems of marketing. Small users were found readily enough.<sup>11</sup> but Doheny wanted the railroads to use his oil, a market which he did not secure for over five years. Meanwhile he and Canfield continued to search for new oil fields, sometimes separately and sometimes as partners.<sup>12</sup> Doheny prospected for oil as he had for gold, making frequent inspection trips and using a report of a state geologist who had located in person all the oil exudes in the state.<sup>13</sup> In this way Doheny was successful in opening several new fields. But the railroads were still doubtful that supplies would be adequate. To convince them, Doheny actually contracted to deliver Peruvian oil at San Diego at \$1.25 a barrel should the California fields fail to produce sufficient quantities. When the latter did this, Doheny sold his Peruvian holdings, acquired as early as 1894, to the International Petroleum Company, a subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey.<sup>14</sup>

Successful experiments in substituting oil for coal on locomotives were made for the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe in 1897 by Doheny, Canfield, E. A. Edwards, and A. P. Maginnis (who was later to begin Doheny's oil development in Mexico). The first attempt to use oil for fuel on ships had ended in a disastrous explosion in San Francisco harbor. Oil-driven locomotives had been attempted in the East but without success. Because of these failures it took several months of persuasion and hard work before the experiments of 1897 could be undertaken.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>10</sup> All told, by 1895, the central or Old Field had 308 producing wells, and by 1913 more than 2,300 had been drilled in Los Angeles field and of these nearly 1,000 had been abandoned. Derricks almost touched each other in places. John Ise, *The United States Oil Policy*, New Haven, 1926, 87-88; Whitney, 112; *National Cyclopaedia*, 499.

<sup>11</sup> *Los Angeles Times*, September 9, 1935; also interview with H. G. Wylie, September 9, 1941.

<sup>12</sup> Whitney, 112-117.

<sup>13</sup> The geologist whose report of 1887 Doheny used was W. A. Good-year; cf. Doheny, "History and Future of Oil Industry in Mexico," *Mexican Petroleum*, 23.

<sup>14</sup> Doheny obtained leases on large tracts of land in Peru adjoining the tidewater and sent skilled staffs with American machinery to open a field, this in spite of his conviction that the oil supply in California was adequate. *Los Angeles Times*, September 9, 1935.

<sup>15</sup> The Santa Fe made its first experiments with light oil taken from the Coalinga fields of Canfield. These trials were under the direction of Doheny's and Canfield's business associate, J. A. Chanslor, who not only assisted in equipping the locomotive but also served as fireman on the trial trip over the track between Los Angeles and Riverside. Chanslor thought the experiment a "perfect success," but within a few weeks an accident owing to the carelessness of a workman caused the destruction of the locomotive, the



At the same time, in order to insure an adequate supply of oil, the Fullerton district was being developed by Doheny, and the Bakersfield-Kern River district, his third field, was developed with his old friend Canfield the following year. These enterprises placed Doheny at the head of one of the greatest oil industries in the world.<sup>16</sup>

Having developed the Kern River district, Doheny was anxious to sell out and go to a new field. This is a typical example of the restlessness in his character which caused much displeasure and discomfort to his business associates.<sup>17</sup> Canfield, too, was ready for new fields to conquer. This time they turned their attention to Mexico. Doheny's interest in Mexico had been stimulated by A. A. Robinson, president of the Mexican Central Railway, whom he had met in California on a trip through one of his oil districts.<sup>18</sup> Robinson had at the time suggested that Doheny prospect along the route of the Mexican Central for oil for use on that line, offering Doheny transportation to Mexico for an inspection tour.<sup>19</sup>

Even before Spanish times the Indians of Mexico had used the bitumen and asphalt seepage (the *chapuputli* or *chapopote*) as cement in their buildings, as calking for their canoes, and as oil in their vestal fires. Later the Spaniards made little use of

roundhouse, and many of the railroad's engines. Doheny and Canfield kept after the officials of the Santa Fe and finally persuaded General Manager K. H. Wade of the Southern California Railway, part of the Santa Fe system, to make additional experiments. Old switch engine No. 10 was brought from the scrap heap in San Bernardino, its fire box remodeled, an oil burner installed, and an oil tank placed in the tender. The burner was an exact copy of one installed in Peru for the consumption of oil residuum as fuel for locomotives of that country. Again the experiment was unsuccessful during trial runs to Santa Barbara, but finally E. A. Edwards installed a force-feed burner with steam jet, and after six months of improvements, it was declared satisfactory. In fact, old No. 10 was doing more service than any switch engine in the station. *Los Angeles Times*, loc. cit.; Whitney, 127-130; *National Encyclopedia*, Current Volume A, 499.

<sup>16</sup> After the Bakersfield development, Canfield in 1900 acquired the deep well district of Midway, about thirty miles southwest of the Kern River area, which became the greatest gross producer in California. Whitney, 134; *Los Angeles Times*, loc. cit.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.* Whitney, 130; interviews with Frank R. Seaver and Herbert G. Wylie.

<sup>18</sup> *I. M. A.*, I, 209; *Los Angeles Times*, loc. cit.; Doheny, "History," *Mexican Petroleum*, 15-16. (See above, note 15.) After Doheny persuaded Wade to use fuel oil and the oil burner had been installed, Wade still frequently called upon Doheny to make trips with him through the oil fields and to explain indications to him and his guests of the trip. On one such trip Doheny met Robinson, one of the pioneer builders of the Santa Fe and one of its early vice-presidents who was also president of the Mexican Central. The party included General Strong, one of the first presidents of the Santa Fe.

<sup>19</sup> *I. M. A.*, I, 109; Ordóñez, loc. cit., 152.



this type of oil, which was allowed to waste by evaporation.<sup>20</sup> In 1865 permission was granted by the Mexican Ministry of Fomento to Ildefonso López to exploit the petroleum deposits in the San José de las Rusias area in present Tamaulipas. After that attempts with varying degrees of enthusiasm but with little success, except in producing asphalt, were made between 1868 and 1900.<sup>21</sup> These ventures included futile drillings in the Furber, the Tamesí River, the Potrero del Llano, and Cerro Viejo regions, all of which later proved rich in oil. The Cerro Viejo district had been exploited unsuccessfully by the London Oil Trust organized by Cecil Rhodes who abandoned his operations there in 1900, the year Doheny entered the field.<sup>22</sup> Small wonder then that Doheny's and Canfield's optimism in 1900-1901, in risking millions to drill where others had failed was considered sheer folly even by some of their close friends. Before oil was struck in large quantities, Doheny himself had doubts.<sup>23</sup>

On his first trip, made at the request of Robinson, Doheny arrived in Mexico in May 1900, with Canfield and Maginnis, the railroad executive whom he had changed into an oil man.<sup>24</sup> Doheny's private car was transported by the Mexican Central wherever he directed. Acting on information obtained from the industrial commissioner of the railroad, they found oil exudes about thirty-five miles west of Tampico, in the state of San Luis Potosí near the boundary of Vera Cruz. To avoid Americans living in Tampico who were annoying them by requests to become their representatives in Mexico, the party returned to the United States, where Canfield and Doheny interested others in their new project. Among them were R. C. Kerens of St. Louis, former ambassador to Vienna; E. D. Kenna of Chicago, head of

<sup>20</sup> James Middleton, "Mexico, the Land of Concessions," *World's Work*, XXVII, No. 3 (January 1914), 292; *Mexico's Oil*, Government of Mexico, Mexico City, 1940, xxv.

<sup>21</sup> "Chronological Outline of the Oil Industry in Mexico," in Doheny Research Fund Papers, File K, 3599; Ordóñez, *loc. cit.*, 143-144; P. C. A. Stewart, "Early History of Petroleum in Mexico," *Engineering and Mining Journal*, XCVII (January-June 1914), no pag., in Doheny Research Fund Papers, File K, 3601; "History of the Furbero Oil Fields," American Institute of Mining Engineers *Transactions*, LII, 1915, in *ibid.*, File K, 3593-3595; see also same file, 3563-3566.

<sup>22</sup> *I. M. A.*, I, 242; "Chronological Outline of Oil Industry in Mexico," *loc. cit.*, 3599; Ordóñez, *loc. cit.*, 144; John K. Barnes, "America Scouring the World for Oil," *World's Work*, XL, No. 5 (September 1920), 454.

<sup>23</sup> *I. M. A.*, I, 224-225; Ordóñez, 159-160; Doheny, "History," *loc. cit.*, 26-27.

<sup>24</sup> All told, Doheny made sixty-five trips to Mexico in fifteen years, twenty-eight of them with his wife, Carrie Estelle Betzold, in whose honor his private car on the Mexican Central was called *Estelle*. Interview with Herbert G. Wylie; *I. M. A.*, I, 218; Ordóñez, 154.

the legal department of the Santa Fe; W. G. Nevins of Los Angeles, general manager of the Santa Fe; and an old friend, J. A. Chanslor, who had helped with the locomotive experiments in California and had been an associate of Canfield and Doheny in various oil enterprises there. Kenna gave Doheny letters of introduction to several attorneys in Mexico, among them Don Pablo Martínez del Río, Mexico's most noted English-speaking lawyer, who became the legal adviser of the Doheny interests.<sup>25</sup>

When Doheny arrived in Mexico again in August 1900, he wired Mariano de Arguinzoniz, the owner of the Hacienda del Tulillo on which they had examined the exudes, to meet the party at Las Tablas, San Luis Potosí. There the bargain for the purchase of the hacienda was closed orally. Arguinzoniz continued with them to Aguascalientes where he was paid \$25,000 by check from Doheny indorsed by Martínez del Río. Final papers were drawn up by November 1900. Doheny paid \$325,000 for approximately 283,000 acres which had been formerly placed on the market for \$75,000 less. Among the documents furnished by Arguinzoniz was a book six inches thick containing the records of ownership beginning with the initial grant by Philip II of Spain to the Marquis of Guadalcázar in 1581, showing title practically in the same family down to the time when Doheny purchased the hacienda. Martínez del Río also had Arguinzoniz renounce all claims to subsoil rights because by Mexican law unknown or unsuspected values might represent, if not renounced in the purchase documents, a possible claim on the part of the former owner to an interest in the property.<sup>26</sup> The area bought was soon increased by the additional purchase of the adjoining Hacienda de Chapacao, giving the Doheny interests about 448,000 acres in one tract. Doheny paid about \$600,000 for this land.<sup>27</sup> It is interesting to note that later Doheny frequently and almost belligerently was able to boast that all his interests had been bought outright or leased on the basis of cash rental and that he had received no concessions of land from the Mexican government.<sup>28</sup>

Doheny sold his California interests to the Santa Fe Railroad for over a million and a quarter dollars after completing the purchase of his Mexican properties in the fall of 1900. Then on

<sup>25</sup> *I. M. A.*, I, 209-210; Doheny, "History," *loc. cit.*, 15-16.

<sup>26</sup> *I. M. A.*, I, 211; see also typed MS in Doheny Research Fund Papers marked "Doheny."

<sup>27</sup> *I. M. A.*, I, 211-222; Doheny, "History," *loc. cit.*, 18-19.

<sup>28</sup> *I. M. A.*, I, 229, 238.

December 20, 1900, he incorporated the Mexican Petroleum Company of California, later called the Ebano Company by Doheny adherents.<sup>29</sup> This was the first of several companies organized for the development of his Mexican interests. A contract had already been signed with Robinson to supply the Mexican Central with oil on the line from Aguascalientes to Tampico.<sup>30</sup> The oil camp was established on this line in February 1901, at kilometer 613, called the Ebano Station. The first rigs for drilling were ready on May 1, 1901, and the first well was brought in two weeks later, May 14, with a yield of only fifty barrels a day at a depth of 525 feet.<sup>31</sup>

Difficulties now entered the scene. The American stockholders and the Mexicans as well had feared that this venture would be another failure.<sup>32</sup> When only a fifty-barrel well was brought in, they were certain of it, and Mexican geologists and officials thereupon joined in denouncing the attempt as pure folly.<sup>33</sup> It was indeed many years before Mexican investors became interested in the oil lands.<sup>34</sup>

Another obstacle, and perhaps the greatest one, was the abrogation of the contract to furnish oil to the Mexican Central, the market Doheny needed to keep his business going. Although the oil flow was not great, it was sufficient to furnish fuel for the railroad. The contract called for the delivery by the railroad of a locomotive to be converted into an oil-burner at the expense of the Doheny company and its reconversion back to coal if the experiment proved unsuccessful. To Doheny's surprise, two weeks after the flow of oil began, he received notice that the contract had been voided by the new chairman of the railway's executive board, Henry Clay Pierce, who was interested in marketing the kerosene of the Waters-Pierce Oil Company in Mexico.<sup>35</sup> Doheny's oil was too heavy to refine, his stockholders were withdrawing their support, and ruin stared him in the face, when he hit upon a plan of using asphalt for paving the streets of Mexican cities.

<sup>29</sup> Private Records of Herbert G. Wylie; *I. M. A.*, I, 227.

<sup>30</sup> *I. M. A.*, I, 214.

<sup>31</sup> *I. M. A.*, I, 213-214, 219-220, 241-242; Ordóñez, *loc. cit.*, 156; *Mexican Petroleum*, 49-52.

<sup>32</sup> *I. M. A.*, I, 211-212, 233-234; Doheny Research Fund Papers, File K, 3598.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 3598; *I. M. A.*, I, 216; Ordóñez, *loc. cit.*, 158-159; Doheny, "History," *loc. cit.*, 26-28.

<sup>34</sup> Doheny Research Fund Papers, File K, 3598.

<sup>35</sup> *I. M. A.*, I, 214-215, 241-242; "Interview with Harold Walker," Doheny Research Fund Papers; "Death of Henry Clay Pierce," *Mexican Commerce and Industry*, IX, No. 7 (July 1927), 14, copy in Doheny Research Fund Papers.

A small refinery was established at Ebano to produce asphalt from the heavy oil, and a company was organized to market it. After some trouble paving contracts were made with Mexico City, Guadalajara, Morelia, Tampico, Durango, Puebla, and Chihuahua.<sup>36</sup> Regarding this paving venture Doheny later commented that the "failure to have a railway contract with the Mexican Central Railroad gave Mexico the best pavement on terms cheaper than probably any country in the world, and the cities named soon became the best paved cities in the world.

. . ."<sup>37</sup>

Another difficulty was the failure to find oil in larger quantities. In fact Doheny and Canfield had spent three million dollars before their first good well, 1,700 barrels, began to flow in 1904.<sup>38</sup> But in the interim certain interrelated factors were making for success. For example, notwithstanding the opposition and skepticism displayed by certain Mexicans and by some people connected with the company, President Díaz and others in the Mexican government showed faith in the enterprise and aided Doheny. This connection with Díaz led to exemptions in taxes and also to a valuable acquaintanceship with a geologist, Ezequiel Ordóñez, who was to help greatly in bringing success to the company. Another factor was the displacement of Maginnis by a much more energetic and able manager, Herbert G. Wylie, who had been connected with Doheny as early as 1893 and has been in the Bakersfield development.<sup>39</sup> Maginnis, who had never really had his heart in his work, had nevertheless been able to get much done in beginning the venture, but it was Wylie who kept it going and remained until 1925 the driving force of the company in Mexico. Energetic, fair, looking after the interests of the workers as well as of the Doheny companies, strong of will, Wylie probably more than any other one man made the Doheny companies of Mexico the most successful oil producers there.<sup>40</sup>

<sup>36</sup> *I. M. A.*, I, 215; typewritten MS. in Doheny Research Fund Papers, marked in pencil, "Doheny"; "Interview with Harold Walker."

<sup>37</sup> *I. M. A.*, I, 216.

<sup>38</sup> Doheny, "History," *loc. cit.*, 35; Whitney, 136-141.

<sup>39</sup> Interviews with Herbert G. Wylie and with Robert G. Cleland, Los Angeles, September 8, 1941.

<sup>40</sup> Interview with Robert G. Cleland, September 8, 1941; "Interview with Herbert G. Wylie," Doheny Research Fund Papers, File K, 3625-3629, Interview No. 597. Since Wylie was a Presbyterian of Scotch-Irish descent and Doheny's forbears came from Tipperary, Doheny later enjoyed telling his friends that the success of his Mexican ventures was entirely due to the association of north and south Ireland, to the perfect mingling of Home Rule and Orangeism, in the tropics of Mexico. *I. M. A.*, I, 228.



Wylie became manager in 1902, and with his advent things began to hum.<sup>41</sup>

Still, even with Wylie in the saddle, for several months the production of oil did not reach large quantities. The wells discovered in the first four years of operations ran from ten to fifty barrels per day. Yet there was actually no market for more oil even if more could be found by drilling deeper as some experts had suggested. But in addition, everyone, including Doheny, was skeptical by now about the existence of oil in large quantities, at least in the Ebano district.<sup>42</sup> Despite all his doubts, Doheny kept on and began to buy up the stock of those who were more doubtful than he. Upon his own admission, at the formation of the company he held eight per cent of the stock, but because of the general skepticism and a depression in oil in 1902 due to the opening of the Texas fields, he was able to buy enough additional stock to give him a forty per cent interest.<sup>43</sup> Reports have it that he sold or pawned Mrs. Doheny's jewels in the trying days between 1901 and 1904.<sup>44</sup>

Now an interesting thing occurred that was to change the entire future of the business. When Doheny first came to Mexico in 1900, his lawyer, Martínez del Río, feeling doubtful that oil would be discovered, told Doheny that he might as well take advantage of all the help he could get from the government. Following his advice, the Mexican Petroleum Company made efforts to obtain the exemption from taxes granted to new industries. They had to get a statement from the governor of each state that no oil company was operating at that time within his state. All the governors finally sent certifications to this effect. Thereupon, Martínez del Río, in his own name, received permission to import free of federal duties for ten years all materials and supplies needed to conduct the Doheny industry. In addition the company was to be exempt from all other federal taxes except the stamp tax. No other developer of petroleum would be

<sup>41</sup> Interview with Herbert G. Wylie, September 8, 1941; *I. M. A.*, I, 228-229; *Press Reference Library (Southwest Edition)*, 377.

<sup>42</sup> *I. M. A.*, I, 215.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 225-227, 241; typewritten MS. in Doheny Research Fund Papers, 6 pages, no identification.

<sup>44</sup> Interview with Frank R. Seaver, September 11, 1941. In the midst of this trouble, Doheny's attitude is expressed in a letter to his newly made Mexican friend, Ordóñez, in which he said, "I hope that you will always remember and bear in mind that my interest in the successful carrying out of all details of our great plan is unabated, and that my determination is just as great as it ever has been to make a financial, as well as an historical success of the Mexican Petroleum enterprise." Ordóñez, *loc. cit.*, 165.



entitled to these tax exemptions unless the Doheny company abandoned its effort to develop the petroleum industry, an understanding that Doheny later contended was not carried out by the Mexican government. In return for these exemptions, the company had to make a list of the supplies needed and of the areas affected and to furnish a map of these sections, and had to agree to expend five hundred thousand gold pesos in developing the industry within five years. Canfield objected to binding themselves to spend this large sum because at the end of the five-year period they would merely be relieved of certain inconsiderable taxes, and if the development failed, they would be the losers. But the arrangement was finally accepted,<sup>45</sup> and according to Doheny it was the only tax exemption of that type ever made in Mexico. It lapsed in 1909.<sup>46</sup>

As already noted, failure stared Doheny and Canfield in the face by 1903, in spite of their favored position with regard to tax exemptions. They had practically exhausted their own fortunes. Doheny had sold his California interests. He had to do something. At this time a minor political squabble in Mexico came to his rescue, a squabble that was to involve his competitor, Henry Clay Pierce, the man who had abrogated his contract to furnish oil to the Mexican Central. Perhaps it was retribution that was to make Doheny the beneficiary of the misfortunes of the Waters-Pierce Oil Company.

<sup>45</sup> Martínez del Río wanted Doheny to see President Díaz, even though Martínez del Río was no *persona grata* with the administration because his father had supported Maximilian and served under him as ambassador to France. Doheny, however, was introduced to Díaz by the ambassador of the United States, General Powell Clayton. Out of this introduction grew a fairly intimate friendship, intimate enough at least for Díaz to see Doheny during the rush period of the Second Pan American Conference held in Mexico City in 1902, to the surprise of even Doheny himself. Díaz told Doheny that he was interested in any industrial development that Doheny might propose. He told him of iron deposits he had seen in his native state of Oaxaca in his boyhood, of his wish to save the public domain of Mexico, especially the forest lands, and of his desire to avoid the necessity of importing coal to Mexico and losing gold in exchange. He told Doheny that his people were good and needed his protection and love and that he wanted to see them uplifted. In another meeting Díaz asked Doheny if he were connected in any way with the Standard Oil Company, and when Doheny replied in the negative, Díaz made him promise never to see out to Standard Oil without first letting the Mexican government have the opportunity to buy the property and prevent its falling into the hands of a powerful foreign corporation. It would be difficult to determine from the events of 1925, when Doheny sold his properties, whether this promise was kept in its entirety, although in a strict sense, the elimination of Díaz from Mexican politics could perhaps be considered as a basis for voiding the promise. *I. M. A.*, I, 212, 218-219, 224; MS "Doheny" in Doheny Research Fund Papers; Interview with Herbert G. Wylie; Doheny, "History," *loc. cit.*, 21-22.

<sup>46</sup> MS. "Doheny," in Doheny Research Fund Papers; *I. M. A.*, I, 212-213.

A conflict over taxes between the Mexican government and the Waters-Pierce Company led to efforts on the part of José Ives Limantour, the Minister of Hacienda, to eject the company from the kerosene market in Mexico. Limantour suggested to the Instituto Geológico that an inspection be made of the Mexican Gulf Coast to see whether there was any possibility of developing a native oil production and to investigate at the same time the activities of the Mexican Petroleum Company at Ebano and of other firms now gradually acquiring lands in Mexico, such as the British company, Pearson and Son, Ltd. A commission of two geologists was created toward the end of 1901, which left for the coast in February 1902. They were Ezequiel Ordóñez and a man named Virreyes, with the former as chairman. What Ordóñez saw at the Ebano field alone convinced him that the prospects for oil were excellent. But the other man opposed this view and was upheld by Limantour, by the president of the Instituto Geológico, a man named Aguilera, and by the Instituto itself. As a result Ordóñez was discredited and Doheny was infuriated. Doheny later contended that Aguilera had socialist ideas and wanted to bring about the nationalization of the petroleum industry, and that the Instituto actually embarked upon an investigation to see whether nationalization was possible. The investigation, in which Doheny naturally was greatly interested, proved that it was inadvisable, at least according to Doheny.<sup>47</sup>

Ordóñez now threw in his lot with Doheny just at the time when the company was on its last legs with no increased production in sight. One night in December 1903 Ordóñez found himself in the Doheny camp at Ebano on a vacation. Doheny, who had just arrived from Los Angeles, told Ordóñez that he and Canfield were greatly disturbed over the prospects of their company; that a goodly part of their fortunes had been lost; and that they could get no more money.<sup>48</sup>

The company had been drilling on a level spot between the Cerro de la Dicha and the station of Ebano. Ordóñez had frequently argued that a better place would be the foot of the Cerro de la Pez, basing his contention on his own geological investigations of the area. The Cerro de la Pez region showed two of the largest *chapopoteras* west of Tampico, at the contact between the basalt of the Cerro de la Pez and the shales touching it. This bituminous oil must be coming, he contended, from an area of

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 216-217; Ordóñez, *loc. cit.*, 157-159.

<sup>48</sup> Ordóñez, 159.

weak resistance, the area of friction or contact between lava and shales. He suggested therefore that they drill a short distance from the foot of the Cerro de la Pez, away from the lava. Ordóñez's suggestion precipitated a long and angry discussion that night, but the next morning they went to the place he favored, a small caravan of four serious men—Doheny, Canfield, Wylie, and Ordóñez. Going by rail part of the way and by canoe the rest, they arrived at La Pez, where Ordóñez marked a place for drilling, a point a little outside the suggested *chapopotera* and several meters from the steep lava outcropping at the foot of the ridge. The selection brought another burst of protests, but Ordóñez prevailed upon Doheny to support him.<sup>49</sup>

Out of this singular adventure sprang the first well of outstanding commercial production, the La Pez No. 1, brought in on Easter Sunday, April 3, 1904, after a little more than three months of drilling. The well began to flow at 1,450 feet, producing on the first day a thousand barrels and increasing gradually to 1,700 barrels. With a gravity of about ten, it was the heaviest oil Doheny had ever seen produced in such quantities. As late as 1919 this well was still yielding eight hundred barrels a day after fifteen years of flow.<sup>50</sup>

These were the beginnings of commercial oil production in Mexico, with Doheny the enthusiastic driving force, Canfield the silent yet strong backer, and Wylie the field manager, energetic, efficient, and enterprising. Having now sufficient oil, Doheny found it easy to persuade Pierce to make a new contract to furnish fuel to the Mexican Central.<sup>51</sup> But Doheny, in his usual manner, wanted to start something new, and so in 1906 he explored the lands that had been abandoned by the Rhodes interests in 1900, about seventy miles south of Tampico and west of the Laguna de Tamiahua. Out of this trip sprang the famous Huasteca Petroleum Company (organized under the laws of Maine on February 12, 1907, with an authorized capital of fifteen million dollars), and its subsidiaries (the Tuxpam Petroleum Company and the Tamiahua Petroleum Company, organized in Maine in 1906).<sup>52</sup> Thus by 1907 the holdings of Doheny had become so extensive in Mexico that he could organize a holding company, the Mexican Petroleum Company, Limited, of Dela-

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, 159-161; Doheny, "History," *loc. cit.*, 26-28.

<sup>50</sup> *I. M. A.*, I, 215-216; Ordóñez, 161.

<sup>51</sup> Interview with Herbert G. Wylie; *I. M. A.*, I, 215-216.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 229-231, 242; Private Papers of Herbert G. Wylie; Doheny, "History," *loc. cit.*, 28-35.

ware, was incorporated four days after the Huasteca company.<sup>53</sup>

The first well in the new Huasteca field came in too soon and had to be shut in after all the available storage tanks had been filled. The second well, the Juan Casiano No. 7, a gusher, blew in on September 11, 1910. Several hundred thousand barrels of oil from this well had to be burned to prevent devastation when the concrete reservoir was filled and the oil began to flow into a nearby creek. Casiano No. 7 started with a production of 70,000 barrels a day unrestrained and 25,000 barrels when partially shut in.<sup>54</sup>

Now, Doheny was a millionaire again, but his greatest gusher, the greatest gusher in the history of oil production, had not even been drilled. This well, Cerro Azul No. 4, blew in on February 10, 1916, and was closed in only after the greatest difficulty nine days later. Cerro Azul No. 4 reached a maximum production of over 260,000 barrels a day before being closed in.<sup>55</sup> The Doheny interests were now producing more than a million dollars worth of oil a week. And still the oil wells came in.<sup>56</sup>

Oil production reached its greatest height in Mexico in 1921 with over 193,000,000 barrels for that year, or about half the United States production.<sup>57</sup> From September 1916 until November 1919, when it began to show signs of exhaustion, the famous Cerro Azul well alone produced 85,000,000 barrels of oil.<sup>58</sup> The Doheny interests before 1925 produced about 560,000,000 barrels of oil in Mexico.<sup>59</sup> Within twenty years, 1901-1921, Mexican pro-

<sup>53</sup> The capital stock of the holding company was \$60,000,000. *I. M. A.*, I, 226; *Mexican Petroleum*, 55; *Mexico's Oil*, 87.

<sup>54</sup> *I. M. A.*, 229-230, 242; *Mexican Petroleum*, 55-56; Ordóñez, 193-194; Interview with Herbert G. Wylie.

<sup>55</sup> The well blew in from a depth of 1,792 feet. The force was so great that it destroyed the derrick, blew the oil into the air 600 feet, and caused the drill bit weighing two tons to be imbedded twenty feet in the ground 125 feet from the well. A part record of the well's flow is as follows: February 15: 152,000 barrels; February 16: 190,209; February 17: 211,008; February 18: 221,186; February 19: 260,858. Interview with Wylie; *Cerro Azul No. 4, World's Greatest Oil Well. Progressive Photographs of Its Bringing In and Closing*, New York (Mexican Petroleum Company, Ltd., of Delaware), n. d. *Mexican Petroleum*, 94-108; Ordóñez, *loc. cit.*, 202-204.

<sup>56</sup> A glimpse at the wells produced in 1921 alone will suffice to demonstrate the enormous production of the Doheny interests. They were, in the order in which they came in: Cerro Azul No. 3 with a potential production of 30,000 barrels; Cerro Azul No. 7, 75,000; Tierra Blanca No. 1, 75,000; Cerro Azul No. 9, 100,000; Cerro Azul No. 8, 100,000; Cerro Azul No. 11, 100,000; Cerro Viejo No. 3, 40,000; Cerro Azul No. 12, 25,000; Cerro Azul No. 10, 25,000; Cerro Azul No. 15, 75,000; Cerro Azul No. 16, 25,000; Cerro Azul No. 14, 20,000. *Mexican Petroleum*, 57.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, 213; Ordóñez, 187.

<sup>58</sup> Doheny, "History," *loc. cit.*, 33. According to Wylie, Cerro Azul No. 4 yielded 160,000,000 barrels.

<sup>59</sup> Interview with Herbert G. Wylie.



duction had jumped from a little over 10,000 barrels a year to more than 193,000,000 barrels,<sup>60</sup> with a total production for the twenty years of over 725,000,000 barrels.<sup>61</sup> These exceptional yields came from comparatively few wells, and gusher conditions eliminated pumping. The 250,000 producing wells in the United States in 1920 averaged less than five barrels a day while the three hundred producing wells in Mexico in the same year averaged 1,800 barrels per day.<sup>62</sup> Of all the producers in Mexico, the Doheny companies were the largest. In fact, when Doheny decided to sell out, his production was at its peak with gross receipts for the month of April 1925 amounting to \$10,500,000. The year before he had estimated the value of his interests in Mexico at \$218,000,000,<sup>63</sup> and yet he is reported to have sold out in 1925 for only \$36,000,000.<sup>64</sup>

Doheny never retired. For the next ten years, until his death at the age of seventy-nine, he was active in oil development in California. In Los Angeles his friends still remember him as the man who personally discovered more oil than any other man on earth.

FRITZ L. HOFFMANN

University of Colorado  
Boulder, Colorado

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<sup>60</sup> *Mexico y Sus Recursos Naturales*, published by Secretaría de Industria, Comercio y Trabajo, Mexico City, 1922, 180-181; Ordóñez, 187-188.

<sup>61</sup> *Mexican Petroleum*, 229.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, 231.

<sup>63</sup> Parker T. Moon, *Imperialism and World Politics*, New York, 1927, 449. For some indications of the social, political, and economic implications of these holdings in Mexico cf. Herbert I. Priestley, *The Mexican Nation, A History*, New York, 1930, 437-439, 453-454.

<sup>64</sup> Interview with Frank R. Seaver, September 11, 1941. Other estimates of the amount of the sale vary. Wylie says that Doheny sold out for \$16,000,000. *Mexico's Oil*, 87, says the sum was over \$150,000,000. Seven years before his death Doheny's fortune was estimated at \$75,000,000. This was divided equally between his wife, his son, and himself. *Los Angeles Times*, September 9, 1935.



## Luis de Valdivia, Defender of the Araucanians

### I

Chile, early the land of the primitive, proud and warlike Araucanians, was brought into the Spanish dominions by Pedro de Valdivia. In 1541 the capital, Santiago, was founded, a *cabildo* was organized, and the conqueror assumed the office of governor and captain general of the region. The central city from which the conquest radiated is situated approximately equidistant from either end and either side of the Republic of Chile, now extending 2,660 miles from the middle to the lower tip of South America. The upper third of Chile, mostly desert and nitrate lands, was left undeveloped in colonial times. The lower third, chiefly islands and scenery, is still to be exploited. The central part was the scene of conquest, settlement, and of perpetual conflict between Spaniards and the Araucanians who occupied the lower half of the middle area. Pedro de Valdivia might be said to have pacified by 1549 the upper portion to a distance south of about 300 miles. Here the Río Bío-Bío meandered from mountain to sea. This famed river seemed a natural dividing line between Spanish holdings and the Araucanian lands. At its mouth Concepción was established in 1550.

Still, Spanish occupations continued southward in the face of opposition. The governor founded towns below the Bío-Bío and protected them by a triangle of forts at Arauco on the coast, Tucapel to the southeast, and Puren to the south. Then he boldly established the southernmost of his cities, Valdivia, nearly 500 miles from Santiago, deep in the hostile land, and Osorno, an outpost. But the conquerors failed to take sufficiently into account the attitude and prowess of the Indians. The Araucanians under their crafty leaders, Aillaralu, Caupolicán, and Lautaro, commenced in 1553 six years of warfare and destruction. Valdivia was slain, his settlements were destroyed below the Bío-Bío, and the Spanish advance had to begin all over. Such back and forth surges became perennial as the Araucanians resisted intrusions below the river by sporadic wars for the remainder of colonial times.

The crux of the difficulty was labor. The wealth of Chile lay in the rich land. This required working, and so Pedro de Valdivia

distributed conquered Indians to his soldier-settlers according to the *encomienda* system. Offensive warfare was waged to get more laborers. Thus there developed in Chile the age-old trouble repeated in the colonial era wherever Spaniard, Portuguese, English, or French settlers came. The Indians, to whom regulated labor was virtually unknown, were neither inclined nor adapted to a day of work. The Araucanians regarded service and labor with a distain similar to that of the Iroquois. Under the *encomienda* plan they were sullen and died off or stole away to freedom in their mountains. Colonists, urged primarily by the instinct of self-preservation, exploited their charges. They forgot their part of the compact, which entailed instruction, Christianization, elevation of the individuals, good example, and paternal care. Religious orders, having a program diametrically opposed to that of conqueror and colonist, became champions of Indian freedom from personal servitude. Thus there was conflict wherever missionaries were at work, one which took on varying aspects in relation to the particular geo-economic characteristics of the region occupied. In this case it was Araucania, and oddly enough the prime defender of the natives, Father Luis de Valdivia, bore the name of the early *conquistador*.

After the death of the first governor, his successors showed a spark of concern over the plight of the Indians around Santiago. Pedro de Valdivia had introduced ten ecclesiastics to Chile: three secular priests and seven Mercedarians. As time passed the need for others grew, and a royal *cédula* charged the Order of St. Dominic in Peru with the duty of dispatching priests to Chile. Three Dominican friars arrived in 1552 and founded a convent in Santiago. Of these, Fray Gil González de San Nicolás, like Las Casas and other Dominicans in the north, spoke out against Indian abuses. No one, however, could offer a practical plan to eradicate evils. The establishment of the first Franciscan convent took place in 1553. By 1593 the Dominicans had four convents, the Franciscans eight, and the Mercedarians six. In this year the Jesuits came, and they were followed by the Augustinians in 1595. To this point practically nothing had been done for the natives below the Río Bío-Bío.<sup>1</sup>

The Society of Jesus had been active in Peru for a quarter of a century before it was invited to Chile. A band of eight missionaries, led by Father Baltasar Piñas, set out from Lima on

<sup>1</sup> Crescente Errázuriz, *Los Orígenes de la Iglesia Chilena, 1530-1603*, Santiago, 1873, 46-47, 50, 97-98, 103, 191-193, 212-220, 442.

February 9, 1593. Surviving a dreadful storm the boats got to Coquimbo, whence the padres continued on muleback to Santiago, arriving April 12, 1593, at the Dominican convent there.<sup>2</sup> Among these first Jesuits was Father Luis de Valdivia, who had already displayed energy and ability as a missionary in Cuzco and Juli. Born in Granada in 1561, he studied at Salamanca before entering the Castillian province of the Society of Jesus at the age of twenty. Shortly after his ordination to the priesthood in 1589, he was sent to Peru where he served in various capacities from teaching theology in the Jesuit college at Lima to mission work among Indians. His intellectual and linguistic achievements, his eloquence, and his administrative aptitude determined his selection for the Chilean enterprise.<sup>3</sup>

A year after the arrival of the Jesuits in Santiago, Father Piñas, feeling the infirmities of his age, returned to Peru. He had witnessed the establishment of the Society in the capital and the beginnings of their classes in the new school. Valdivia was left as superior. Not only did the energetic padre hold a chair of philosophy, once the school developed into an arts college in Santiago, and attend prisoners of war and other natives of the city, but he traveled to the most remote haciendas to alleviate the distress of the victims of personal service. Realizing the priceless asset of the ability to reach the natives through their own tongue, he diligently studied the language. In a very short time he was hearing confessions, preaching, and conversing in the speech of the land. He convinced Governor Don Martín Gracia de Loyola of the absolute necessity of having all cleric ministers to the indigines versed in native languages, and he ordered Jesuits under his jurisdiction to perfect themselves in them.<sup>4</sup>

Remarkable success soon came to Valdivia and his fellow spiritual trail blazers. Besides instructing Indians attached to the Spanish haciendas, the fathers journeyed regularly to the Indian *rancherías*, where they assembled the tribesmen, and

<sup>2</sup> Pablo Pastells, S. J., *Historia de la Compañía de Jesús en la Provincia del Paraguay*, Madrid, 1912, I, 100.

<sup>3</sup> Miguel de Olivares, S. J., *Historia de la Compañía de Jesús en Chile*, in Diego Barros Arana, *Colección de Historiadores de Chile y Documentos Relativos a la Historia Nacional*, 45 vols., Santiago, 1861-1923 (hereinafter cited as *C. H.*), VII, 14; Francisco Enrich, S. J., *Historia de la Compañía de Jesús en Chile*, Barcelona, 1891, I, 14; Carlos Sommervogel, S. J., *Bibliothèque de la Compagnie de Jésus*, Paris, 1908, 377-382.

<sup>4</sup> Olivares, in *C. H.*, VII, 18; Enrich, I, 22, 28, 37-45, 52-54; Errázuriz, *Orígenes*, 434; José Toribio Medina, *Biblioteca Hispano-Chilena*, Santiago, 1897, I, 189-192; Rodolfo R. Schuller, *Discovery of a Fragment of the Printed Copy of the Work on the Millcayac Language by Luis de Valdivia*, Cambridge, 1913.

taught them pious practices and hymns in their own language. They studied the habits, needs, character, and inclinations of the natives around Santiago and those to the southward. These experiences revealed to Valdivia the possibility of elevating the race, but, on the other hand, the futility of hoping for true spiritual progress under the existing system of personal service. It did not seem possible to ground the natives in the principles of the Christian faith or to instill the new spirit when they were so bonded by the *encomenderos*.<sup>5</sup>

However, progress of the missions southward continued. The spiritual victories of the Black Robes along the frontier, the Bío-Bío territory, convinced them that a wealth of souls could be harvested among the more intelligent Araucanians under more peaceful conditions. After happy contacts had been made with the natives of Arauco, 300 miles south of Santiago, Valdivia made journeys from this as a base to the settlements and villages of the borderland, preaching to the Spaniards and evangelizing the natives. In Arauco many were instructed and baptized.

From this point the father and his companion set forth on a long missionary tour, first to Imperial, then to Villarica, Valdivia, and finally to Osorno over 500 miles south of the capital. During this seven months' expedition of 1597 throngs of natives flocked together to hear the Jesuits speak, and an impressive number of infidels were baptized. But they became aware of the Indians' attitude toward servitude, enforced labor, warfare, and especially of a growing resentment towards the low moral conduct of Spanish soldiery in the outposts. Upon their return to the College of Santiago they warned the Spanish authorities of impending trouble, but their warnings met with indifference and derision.<sup>6</sup>

The cauldron of rebellion was not long in boiling over. On November 22, 1598, while camping on their march from Imperial to Angol, Governor García Oñez, his company of sixty, and three Franciscans were slain by Indians under the leadership of the *cacique* Paillamachu. News of the crippling of the military arm of the Spaniards got abroad. Within two days the Cunchese and Huilliches provinces were in revolt, as well as the Araucanians around Osorno, Valdivia, Villarica, Imperial, Cañete, Angol, Coya, and the fortress of Arauco. The first six of these places

<sup>5</sup> Olivares, in *C. H.*, VII, 22-23; Enrich, I, 24-25.

<sup>6</sup> Olivares, in *C. H.*, VII, 46-47; Enrich, I, 64-65, 67-68.



were destroyed and surrounding lands devastated. Refugees who escaped death were gathered north of the Bío-Bío. Although the physical results of this revolt were disastrous, the spiritual and moral results had far more serious aftermaths. The new governor and his successor adopted the aggressive warfare policy, waging savage but ineffectual battles. Hatred dominated both sides in the conflicts. The land was one of war with no truce imminent.<sup>7</sup>

Within the Jesuit Order a reorganization was taking place. In 1602 Father Páez, on his inspection of the Jesuit houses of Chile as *visitador*, noted with sorrow the turmoil into which the province had been thrown. In the redistribution of men occurring at the time, Father Valdivia was called back to Peru in 1602 to take again the vacant chair in theology at the College of Lima. He had derived through his missionary experiences in Chile the knowledge of the fundamental facts of the Indian problem there and thus had concluded the preparatory phase of his career among the Araucanians. The second phase, that of championing the cause of the liberty loving people, was to witness his endeavors in Peru, again in Chile, and in Spain.<sup>8</sup>

## II

Attack and counterattack on the part of Indians and whites was the order of the day in Chile, each becoming less destructive only because there was less left to destroy. In Spain, recurring orders and demands were issued by the crown to curtail the costly war. Hearing of Valdivia's discussions in regard to the causes of the war, the Viceroy of Peru, Marqués de Salina, requested him to draw up a detailed account of the situation. A *memorial*, composed in compliance with this request, frankly declared the existing system of personal service to be the underlying source of all the evils that had arisen in the struggles between the Araucanians and the Spaniards.<sup>9</sup>

To give consideration to this *memorial*, a conference was held

<sup>7</sup> Juan Ignacio Molina, S. J., *The Geographical, Natural and Civil History of Chile*, London, 1809, II, 253, 254; Diego de Rosales, S. J., *Historia General del Reino de Chile*, Valparaíso, 1878, II, 229-326, 355; Olivares, in *C. H.*, VII, 47; Enrich, I, 77-78; Pastells, I, 201-203; Medina, *Biblioteca Hispano-Chilena*, II, 5-20; Domingo Amunátegui Soler, *Las Encomiendas de Indígenas en Chile*, Santiago, 1909, I, 355; Crescente Errázuriz, *Historia de Chile . . .*, Santiago, 1914, I, 291-292.

<sup>8</sup> Olivares, in *C. H.*, VII, 49-51, 54; Enrich, I, 81-82, 88-89; Antonio Astrain, S. J., *Historia de la Compañía de Jesús en la Asistencia de España*, Madrid, 1912-1925, IV, 692-693.

<sup>9</sup> Enrich, I, 100-101; see also Amunátegui, *Las Encomiendas*, II, 371, 373.



by the most notable personages of Peru, including the governor-elect of Chile, García Ramón, and Padre Valdivia. This junta, resolving to abolish personal service, allowed two years for the accomplishment of the transition from forced to voluntary labor, though it strongly urged that this transition be effected sooner.<sup>10</sup>

Valdivia was delegated to make a tour of southern Chile, further to investigate the situation. Again he had the opportunity to practice his zeal in converting, civilizing, and protecting his Araucanians. He embarked at Callao accompanied by Governor Ramón and two hundred soldiers. They docked at Penco, March 19, 1605. It should be noted clearly that Valdivia was commissioned as a civil as well as ecclesiastical personage. His authority was substantiated by *cédulas* given him in Peru in the name of his Majesty: "con autoridad de Su Majestad." He carried instructions to: (1) offer a general pardon to the Indians for all their former misdeeds; (2) make it clear that the king did not approve personal service as it was practiced in Chile and now demanded its cessation; (3) sanction tribute only in the form in which the natives were accustomed to pay in their own lands. This third point, considering the fact that in their own lands the natives paid no tribute except in times of war, would indicate that no tribute should be paid to the crown. These instructions were greeted with no joy on the part of the *encomenderos*, and with far more than a grain of suspicion on the part of the Indians.<sup>11</sup>

The task of spreading the report of the new dispensation of the king to abolish the grievances of the natives and come to a peaceful understanding was begun. At Concepción, Valdivia conversed with peaceful chiefs, *toquis*, in an informal junta. At Santiago he had striven to impress the thousand soldiers, who had just arrived from Spain, with their legal and moral obligation to cooperate in the new government plans. Turning southward Valdivia crossed the Bío-Bío and took part in another junta, this time with the *caciques* of Lagunillas. Accompanied by friendly *toquis*, he communicated his message of peace from Arauco through Taboleno, Lapiaré, Mahuda, the region of Cateray, down to Guadava, Puren, Cateray del Sur, and to the fort of Nuestra Señora de Ala. He cultivated the friendship of the natives of Calcura, Penquienhue, Quedico, Quiapo, Tucapel, Le-

<sup>10</sup> *C. H.*, IV, 95; "Copia de vna carta del Padre Luys de Valdiula para el Señor Conde de Lemos . . .," Lima, January 4, 1607, photostat No. 245, 1-2, Massachusetts Historical Society.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*; Astrain, IV, 696; Enrich, I, 103.

buliencoya, and Cayacupil, declaring peaceful intentions and receiving reciprocal declarations from the natives. So suspicious were some of the *toquis* of the good faith of the Spaniards that the padre had to summon all his powers of persuasion to convince them that the civil and military powers were cooperating with the Black Robes. Unfortunately the military leaders merited suspicion by constant breaches of agreements. Some of the *toquis* remained hostile. His tour of inspection concluded, and now thoroughly convinced that his conclusions as to the cause of native belligerency were sound, in the latter part of April 1606, Valdivia embarked for Peru.<sup>12</sup>

In a letter written the following January, the padre clearly expressed his reactions to the investigation. He noted the lack of respect shown to the laws of God and of the king by the soldiers and *encomenderos* of Chile. Especially disappointed was he in García Ramón, whose hostile *entradas* belied the governor's protest that he was attempting peaceful subjugation. Again he denounced personal service as the crux of the whole disorder.<sup>13</sup>

Following the death of the Conde de Monterey, the Marqués de Montes Claros became viceroy. With his encouragement and approval the *oidor* don Juan de Villela and Valdivia wrote memorials to Spain in June 1607, intensifying their arguments regarding the imperative need for a cessation of the abuses resulting from the system of personal service in Chile. In a letter of June 4, 1607, Valdivia expounded the necessity of the abolition of forced labor, abuses, and of personal service, and the necessity for limiting the Spaniards to the territory north of the Bío-Bío, advocating only defensive measures of war. Thus, he sponsored the system which came to be known as *guerra defensiva*, or defensive warfare, as opposed to the existing policy of offensive warfare.

Governor García Ramón was making no pretense at pursuing the type of resistance advocated by Padre Valdivia and approved by the viceroy. On April 12, 1607, he had written to the king saying that the Araucanians had killed more than four hundred persons, that they respected no one, that they clamored against both cleric and soldier; he sincerely hoped no serious consideration be given this theory of Padre Valdivia.

Due to the numerous defeats of the Spanish troops the crown directed Peru to send two thousand regulars to the Araucanian

<sup>12</sup> "Copia de vna carta del Padre Luys de Valdivia . . .," *op. cit.*, 3-4; *C. H.*, VIII, 283-284; Olivares, in *C. H.*, VII, 63; Enrich, I, 104-105.

<sup>13</sup> "Copia de vna carta del Padre Luys de Valdivia . . .," *op. cit.*, 6.

border. Natural forces in Chile were joining in the destruction; the deluge of the Mapocho, famine, and locust devoured fields added to the misery of the natives as well as to the expense of the Peruvian treasury in supporting the soldiers. On May 26, 1608, a harsh royal *cédula* announced that all natives who should not have accepted peace within the following two months would be enslaved. Since 1578, when Rodrigo de Quiróga had reduced hundreds of natives to slavery, transporting them to Coquimbo, his successors not only rivaled his harshness but frequently surpassed him. Following the revolt in 1598, García Ramón followed Ribera's practice of condemning all rebellious Indians to slavery or death. The disaster at Boroa, September 29, 1606, when more than one hundred Spanish soldiers perished, dispelled what qualms might have existed among the members of the Council of the Indies concerning the cruelest of castigations. Under Merlo de la Fuente the enslavement *cédula* of 1608 was interpreted to pertain not only to those on the frontier, but to all natives of Chile.

Meanwhile, the Jesuit Provincial, Torres Bello, had written to the king pleading for abolition of "personal service." He requested further that a general pardon be extended to the natives, absolving them from punishment for misdeeds they might have committed. So unsatisfactory was the progress with the king that Valdivia's ecclesiastical and civil superiors deemed it desirable to have the padre present the plan of *guerra defensiva* personally. So it was that Padre Valdivia sailed for Spain in 1609.<sup>14</sup>

While there is no verbatim record of the private audience Valdivia held with the king, there remains no doubt as to the outline of the plan presented nor of the king's reaction to it. Probably the most complete exposition of Valdivia's scheme of procedure, which he was frequently called upon to amplify, and which many have interpreted in their own fashion, may be found in the padre's own explanation of the situation in a lengthy *informado* which was presented in Madrid probably in 1610.<sup>15</sup>

In the first of the eight chapters of the *tratado*, he dwelled upon the inconveniences encountered in prosecuting an offensive war, focusing attention upon the fact that such a war not only impeded the evangelizing of the natives but was a source of

<sup>14</sup> Amunátegui, *Las Encomiendas*, I, 364-365; Astrain, IV, 684, 697.

<sup>15</sup> Luis de Valdivia, S. J., "Tratado de la importancia del medio que el virrey propone de cortar la guerra de Chile, y hazerla solamente defensiva," Madrid, c. 1611, photostat No. 264, Massachusetts Historical Society.

lamentable moral degradation among the Spanish soldiers. He estimated that 2,600 Spaniards had perished in the war since 1606. Comparable were the number of infidel natives who had perished without the opportunity of or desire for evangelization. Nor were the pacified Indians spared the grief, but suffered from impoverishment, personal service, and attacks of hostile Indians. Since the war had assumed such proportions, personal service had become more firmly and unjustly established regardless of decrees of the monarch. The padre did not hesitate to reveal the lack of cooperation of the authorities of Chile with the instructions of the viceroy in 1606, which directed the eventual abolition of slavery after a thorough investigation assisted by numerous conferences with jurists and theologians. Aside from the spiritual loss, he indicated the financial waste entailed in pursuing an offensive war in which lack of substantial success served to metamorphose a paying project to an eternal debt.

In the second chapter of his *tratado*, Valdivia dealt with the general difficulties encountered in terminating the war through offensive tactics. The geographical problem in itself was insurmountable. The territory in rebellion covered almost one hundred leagues north and south from the *cordilleras* on the east to the Pacific on the west. Of these the northernmost forty leagues had been a battleground since the Spaniards entered Chile. Successful conquest of the land would require countless additional garrisons. The roughness of the land of war further contributed to the difficulties and expenses of offensive warfare. A sufficient supply of horses would in itself prove a tremendous expenditure. Already the viceroy had sent from ten to twelve thousand pesos to Paraguay to purchase horses for the cavalry of Chile, with ineffectual results. On the other hand, in defensive warfare, the infantry, not the cavalry, would bear the brunt of the service, a far less expensive branch of the military service to maintain.

In summary, the first five chapters of the *tratado* presented logically the desirability of discontinuing an offensive war, giving economic, social, and religious reasons. The last three chapters were concerned largely with the outstanding events that had occurred during the war, an historical survey which concluded with an outline of the padre's procedure for effecting an eventual cessation of the war.

Valdivia urged general pardon to the Indians for all their misdoings. Since the natives had been degraded and abused, they



could scarcely be expected to tolerate *entradas* of military men or of civilians; on the other hand they had shown themselves kindly disposed toward the men of the cross. Therefore the most convenient and logical expedient would be to erect a border between the Araucanians and the Spaniards at the Bío-Bío, beyond which only missionaries would pass in order to Christianize the natives and instill true sentiments of friendship.

Captain Lorenzo del Salto had been commissioned by García Ramón to contradict any attempts to inaugurate officially the system fostered by Valdivia. Del Salto stated that within the last two and a half years of García Ramón's governorship nine hundred natives had been slain and more than three thousand taken prisoners—a fact that should instill fear in the hearts of the Araucanians and thus lead to eventual submission.<sup>16</sup>

In the early part of the year 1610, Valdivia's detailed *memorial* in behalf of *guerra defensiva*, and Lorenzo del Salto's divergent opinions, were discussed by the Council of the Indies, and the plan of defensive warfare was adopted officially. Forts were to be retained along the frontier of the Bío-Bío sufficiently manned for resisting any attacks; 200,000 pesos were to be paid from Lima for the support of the army in Chile. Personal service was to be entirely abolished. Prisoners of war were not to be enslaved. Just payments were to be made by the pacified Indians to the king. Jesuit padres were to reside in the forts along the frontier from where they would supervise the treatment of the pacified natives and make their *entradas* into the Indian territory to convert the infidel.<sup>17</sup>

The indulgences granted by Pope Paul V later in the year, October 13, 1610, in the *pastoris eterni*, reveals the attitude of the pope towards the negotiations during this conference. Concerned only with the spiritual side, these indulgences implied papal favor of the method of *guerra defensiva*.<sup>18</sup>

When the plan had been formally accepted, the selection of the most workable means of execution confronted the authorities. Both ecclesiastical and civil authority had to be delegated. Since the Bishop of Santiago had among his numerous aversions a most pronounced animosity towards the Jesuits, his cooperation could not be expected. This aversion was not necessarily to Valdivia, for it had been evidenced before the padre had become

<sup>16</sup> Enrich, I, 178; C. H., IV, 102-105.

<sup>17</sup> Enrich, I, 230, 231; Astrain, IV, 698; C. H., IV, 105.

<sup>18</sup> C. H., VIII, 290-291.

so important. King Felipe III and the viceroy of Peru, the Marqués de Montes Claros, strongly favored conferring the dignity of the bishopric of Imperial upon Valdivia, and his name was formally proposed. The Jesuit General, Claudio Aquaviva, gave the matter serious consideration. He was fully confident that the padre was well qualified for the dignity; however, he expressed a doubt that the objectives of *guerra defensiva* could be most effectively attained by the assumption of this office. Valdivia himself never had indicated an inclination to consider the dignity of the bishopric necessary or desirable. In fact, due in large to his own protestations, he was not made bishop of Imperial. However, he was considered free from Jesuit jurisdiction in the New World, for Aquaviva dispensed him from all such supervision, holding him directly accountable to the General himself. Various titles have been used in reference to Padre Valdivia, among which have been "vice-provincial" or "superior of the frontier missions"; the important fact, disregarding the formal title, lay in the free rein given to him.<sup>19</sup>

The very nature of the policy of *guerra defensiva* demanded a close cooperation of Church and State, and in this case a close union of the religious and the political programs; therefore, ecclesiastical as well as civil powers were combined in the authority of the director of the new system. At the formal meeting called to confer the necessary authority, December 9, 1610, Valdivia was intrusted with extensive and elastic powers to enable him to arrange the inauguration of defensive warfare. He was to act as civil *visitador* of Chile—equivalent to providing him with supreme political control over affairs of the Indian frontier. This appointment was subject to the approval of the viceroy; there was no doubt as to its ratification. Laden with official letters and credentials for the dignitaries of Peru and Chile, Valdivia completed preparations for his return voyage to America.<sup>20</sup>

As ambassador of peace for the Spanish government among hostile Indians, Valdivia was playing a significant rôle familiar to the Jesuits, who, as protectors of the Indians, ever lent their peaceful services in instances such as this when called upon by their government—from the first Jesuits in America, Manuel de Nóbrega and his companions, who served in sixteenth-century

<sup>19</sup> Rosales, II, 531; Molina, II, 266; Astrain, IV, 701, 704, 707, 710-711, 712-713; José Toribio Medina, *Diccionario Biográfico Colonial de Chile*, Santiago, 1905, 898.

<sup>20</sup> Astrain, IV, 705; Olivares, in *C. H.*, VII, 72.

Brazil in a similar capacity, to De Smet, "Ambassador to the Indians" in the United States in the middle nineteenth century.

### III

Early in 1611 Valdivia, with nine Jesuits and two coadjutors, embarked for America. Shortly after his arrival he delivered the king's *cédulas* to the viceroy, and the latter convened a junta, which, in accord with the instructions, decreed, November 22, 1611: that offensive warfare should cease; that the Spaniards retreat to a line of defense along the Bío-Bío; that personal service no longer was to be inflicted. The governor and all the civil and military officials were instructed to cooperate with the directions of the Black Robe.<sup>21</sup>

On the 29th of March, 1612, the slavery law of May 26, 1608, which had condemned to bondage all natives not disposed to cease warfare, was abrogated. On September 8, 1610, a letter had been written by the king to forego the application of his 1608 ruling until *guerra defensiva* should be put into execution, and then to apply it to all natives who should not desist from offensive warfare. These latter provisions indicated that all the natives who had been paying personal service but who should agree to defensive warfare should be given their liberty. On December 8, 1610, the king had given Padre Valdivia a letter addressed to the "caciques, capitanes, toquis, i indios principales de las provincias de Chile," in which the new policy of pacification was carefully explained.

Another order was issued giving approbation to dismantling and depopulating all those forts unessential to the maintenance of the defensive frontier along the Bío-Bío. Henceforth the frontier would be guarded by the forts of Cayugauno, Yumbel, and Santa Fé to the north of the Bío-Bío, and by Nacimiento, Monterrey, San Jerónimo, and Arauco to the south of the river. Each fort was to have a stipulated squadron of resident soldiers ranging in number from 70 to 150. It was thought necessary to retain 80 soldiers in the fort of Lebo, 15 on the *estancia* of Buena Esperanza, 12 in the fort of San Pedro, 50 in the cities of Concepción and Chillan, 100 in the lower city of Castro, and the 40 of Chiloé. These statistics illustrate the comparatively few armed forces required for defensive war. The primary utility of the forts of Angol and Tucapel province had been to afford an

<sup>21</sup> Rosales, II, 531-543; Enrich, I, 231; Astrain, IV, 702; Diego Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, Santiago, 1884-1902, IV, 33.

advantageous stepping stone to further offensive tactics; they were to be immediately dismantled and abandoned. On the other hand the fort of Cuyuguano on the frontier of the Cordillera Nevada provided defense against hostile Indians as well as a shelter for friendly natives who had been subjugated; therefore seventy soldiers were assigned as guards there. The fort of Yumbel, situated in the vicinity of unusually fertile fields, was to be a type of agricultural supply house. For similar strategic reasons certain of the other forts were retained.

Another viceregal order to the royal Audiencia of Santiago exempted Valdivia from its jurisdiction. In this document was the constant reiteration of the trust with which the king and the viceroy respected Valdivia's ability and prudence. The viceroy repeated the authority of Valdivia to abolish personal service, to procure peaceful settlement with the natives, and to administer the requirements of defensive warfare. Further decrees prohibited, under severe penalties, the entrance of all Spaniards except the padres into the Indian territory and pardoned the Indians for their misdoings in previous revolts. Any problem that should arise in the future was to be settled at the discretion of Valdivia, who was now in complete civil and ecclesiastical authority on the troubled Indian frontier of Chile.<sup>22</sup>

With Chile vibrating under her difficulties, the Jesuits were already becoming aware of an increasing ill will toward themselves. As a group, they were the butt of the growing opposition especially of the soldiers and the *encomenderos*. Understandable was the opposition of the *encomenderos*, who were becoming aware of the growing prestige of the padres among the natives. In the Brazilian *aldeias*, where the padres had segregated the natives from the exploitation of the colonists, there was a vivid warning to the *encomenderos* of the possible menace to their economy which the padres might effect. There were other difficulties. The Bishop of Santiago, Fray Juan Pérez de Espinosa, continued to express his aversion towards the Society, and had been unimpressed by Diego de Torres, Provincial of Chile, who attempted a reconciliation. The stand of the Society against personal service was also met by the denunciations of those who were convinced of the futility of attempting conversion of these heathen souls. To them such gentle or humane methods of pacification as advocated by Valdivia bespoke an inability to face

<sup>22</sup> For a discussion of the various decrees described above, see Rosales, II, 533-544; *C. H.*, IV, 105-111.



the realities. Under this delusion created by the men of the sword, some clerics, as well, opposed the work of Valdivia and the Jesuits. Nor did the soldiers take kindly to rigid restrictions against immorality.<sup>23</sup>

Torres related to Aquaviva, February 15, 1612, the struggle of the Jesuits against the form of personal service that existed in Chile. He added that the official regulations which abolished such abuses on paper, and the exhortations of the priests, were woefully disregarded. With great hope and satisfaction Torres greeted Valdivia, whose zealous labors he had always admired.<sup>24</sup>

On May 13, 1612, Valdivia disembarked at Penco intending to continue toward Concepción. Torres, at that time in Santiago, dispatched a message to Valdivia offering him the service of three additional fathers skilled in the Araucanian tongue and familiar with the lands. Valdivia lost no time in presenting his credentials to the *cabildo* of Concepción, where he received formal though insincere assurance of cooperation. He sent word immediately to the superintendents of the regiments and the captains on the frontiers forbidding further *entradas* into Indian territory and demanding that mercy be bestowed on those natives already taken captive.<sup>25</sup>

Valdivia concluded his official preliminaries during his conferences with Governor Ribera and Bishop Espinosa. Seven days after their arrival in Concepción, Valdivia, accompanied by his friend and companion Father Gaspar Sobrino, as well as by five liberated natives from Peru, headed for the Bío-Bío. Four leagues from Concepción they met one of the principal *toquis*, Coronel by name, who expressed great joy upon seeing *los padres*. Before the end of May Valdivia was active among the Indians of the frontier. Natives were dispatched to the interior to announce the new plan of Spain to the various *toquis*. In Arauco Valdivia was visited by Indians from eighteen separate regions.<sup>26</sup>

Heartened by indications of interest displayed by the Indians, he journeyed throughout Arauco and Tucapel. Immediate was his success among the reduced Indians who had been dangerously restless since a revolt the previous February. He lent a patient

<sup>23</sup> Astrain, IV, 684; Medina, *Biblioteca Hispano-Chilena*, I, 183; Barros Arana, *Historia*, IV, 38, 40-41; C. H., IV, 106; Amunátegui, *Las Encomiendas*, I, 380.

<sup>24</sup> Pastells, I, 146-151, 200, 203-207.

<sup>25</sup> "Relación de lo que sucedió en el Reyno de Chile . . .," December 1612, photostat, Massachusetts Historical Society; Barros Arana, *Historia*, IV, 44; Enrich, I, 240, 244; Rosales, II, 548.

<sup>26</sup> "Relación de lo que sucedió en el Reyno de Chile . . ."

ear to their multitude of grievances, announcing the *cédulas* of the king to them, and offering assurance that their aggravations would cease. Native *caciques* had been sent by Valdivia to herald the new policy to the *toquis* in Catiray. While awaiting a reply he found it necessary to return to Concepción to confer with Ribera.<sup>27</sup>

Upon Valdivia's return five *caciques* from Catiray came to him desirous of investigating these reports. To establish complete confidence in his good will, Valdivia, accompanied by but two soldiers, a friendly Indian from Lima, and three *toquis* of Arauco, departed for the treacherous land of war in Catiray. Plans were made for a convention of the most important *toquis* from the vicinity, which would take place at Nancu, near Catiray. The padre attended this junta accompanied by Captain Pinto. Here ten *reguas* were represented. For eight hours the meeting continued. Valdivia exposed the principles of the plan illustrating its advantages. He promised them that they would receive justice from the Spaniards. He reminded the natives of his position as a dual ambassador. First, he was the ecclesiastical representative, in which capacity he had preached to the Spaniards in order to remind them of their Christian obligations and the wrongs they were inflicting upon the natives. He recalled the fact that Christ had died upon the cross for the preservation of all mankind; thus the Araucanians were equal in the sight of the Lord and on that account in the sight of his ministers. Since the king wanted the principles of Christ to be practiced he had commanded the cessation of aggressive war and the abolition of personal service, desiring only that the natives share in the fruits of Christianity. Thus the king had appointed a new governor also, with instructions to live peacefully within the Spanish territory. Only in self-defense would the Spaniards fight.

Carampangui, the principal *cacique*, expressed an inclination to cooperate with the padre, but said that his followers would consider an agreement of pacification only should they be permitted to treat with the Spaniards as an independent nation. Also, before peace could be concluded, certain evils would have to be rectified and certain reforms assured. The first wrong demanding redress would necessitate the return of the Indians who, seized along the border, had been shipped away from their native soil. It was agreed that a reciprocal arrangement for the return of Spaniards and Indians was highly desirable. The *toqui*

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*; C. H., IV, 134; Barros Arana, *Historia*, IV, 49.

demanded that the *cédulas* of the king be enacted justly, and that in the future those *caciques* guilty of violations of the agreement be judged and punished by their own territories. Carampangui added that, since the Spaniards disavowed intentions of further aggression, the fort of San Jerónimo, valued essentially as a foothold for assault upon the natives, was unnecessary. Valdivia assured them, in the name of his Majesty, that the fort would be quitted.

From this assembly Valdivia returned to Santiago, where he informed the audiencia of the fortunate beginnings he had witnessed. From there he went to the fort of Talcamahuyda, where the governor had come from Concepción, and where Catirayan *toquis*, among whom was Carampangui, had assembled to treat for peace. Reassurance was given the Indians by the governor, and the *toquis* returned to their lands with favorable reports concerning their negotiations with the Spaniards. Twelve influential *toquis* with three of the former captives from Peru were commissioned to the land of Puren to herald the new peace. Valdivia sent messages as far south as hostile Chiloé, and the city of Chillan. Concurrently he had initiated hopeful treatings with the *toquis* of Ilicura. *Guerra defensiva* appeared to be accomplishing what *guerra ofensiva* had failed to do for over seventy years.<sup>28</sup>

To carry on his work most effectively, Valdivia had established two missions, one at Monterrey, the other at Arauco. He had received the assistance promised him by Torres. Fathers Horacio Vecchi and Martín de Aranda were sent to Arauco, where, to their surprise, they found not hostile infidels, but pacified natives desirous of further instruction in the Faith. At the same time Valdivia sent Fathers Vicente Modolell and An-

<sup>28</sup> Much confusion exists among the various historians concerning the exact proceedings of many of these juntas attended by Valdivia; thus it is to Valdivia's own accounts that one should turn for the more accurate details. Valdivia's extensive relations of the year 1612 have been photographed by the Massachusetts Historical Society: "Relación de lo que sucedió en el Reyno de Chile después q el Padre Luys de Valdivia, de la Compañía de Iesvs entró en el con fus ocho compañeros Sacerdotes de la misma Compañía, el año de 1612," describes the success of the system until December 14, 1612. "Relación de lo que sucedió en la jornada que hizimos el señor Presidente Alonfo de Ribera Gournador deste Reyno, y yo desde Arauco a Paycaui, a concluir las pazes de Elicura, última regua de Tucapel y las de Pueren y la Imperial," covers the period from March 1612 to December 24, 1612. This was sent to his brother in Lima. "Relación de la muerte de los padres escrita por el Padre Valdivia a 24 de Diziembre de mil syscientos y doze al padre Provincial de Lima." It is to these three relations that constant reference must be made to clarify obscurities in the narrators concerning this year of 1612.

These documents will be cited hereinafter as Valdivia's *Relations*, MS.

tonio de Aparicio to Monterrey. Accompanied by soldiers and by many ambassadors from Ilicura and Puren who had urged a conference with him, Valdivia again took leave of Arauco. While on the way to a place appointed for a junta, Valdivia received numerous messages from the natives, all indicating hope of peaceful negotiations. One Indian *toqui* from Catiray, Lebuilicán, journeyed to San Jerónimo to voice his suspicions of the Spanish generosity. Other *toquis* aligned themselves with those of Puren, as did likewise many of the *Aylla regua* of Tucapel. While this negative sentiment was being voiced, Llacanague, the principal *toqui* of Molloco, and the *Toqui General* of the province of the Cordillera Nevada, arrived from Puren to conclude a peaceful agreement, with the stipulation that the fort of Angol be quitted. Thus was Valdivia put in a position requiring most delicate tact.<sup>29</sup>

In the late summer of 1612 a minor crisis developed which was a culmination of many diverse events and elements. Tureulipe, a native *toqui* who had been held as a prisoner of war since 1611, had recently obtained his freedom. His descriptions of his captivity, his orations against the Spaniards, his derision towards the mediation of Father Valdivia, carried weight among his people. So potent an influence did he exert that he was able to lead an attack against Arauco. Not only did the Spanish forces successfully resist the assault, but the irate *toqui* was again taken prisoner. He finally consented to treat with Valdivia. The incident, however, indicated subversive elements at work. Valdivia hastened to dispatch an ambassador to the *toquis* of Catiray with generous peace offers. The same messenger was to meet the other *toquis* of Puren and Imperial to arrange for peace negotiations. Meanwhile, Ribera and an impressive regiment entered Puren to watch for a movement that might change this stage of indecision to one of war.<sup>30</sup>

The noted belligerent *toqui* of Puren, Anganamón, agreed to sit in at a conference. Valdivia and his companions went to Paicavi, where they awaited the arrival of Anganamón. Nor were they long in waiting. With a guard of forty soldiers, Anganamón brought numerous Spanish prisoners, whom he liberated hoping to receive a similar gesture from the Spaniards. Terms of peace were discussed. Anganamón was deeply impressed by Valdivia's sermon on the possibilities of peace through *guerra defensiva*. Arrangements were made for the exchange of prisoners of war;

<sup>29</sup> Valdivia's *Relations*, MS.; *C. H.*, XIII, 109; Rosales, II, 560-561.

<sup>30</sup> Rosales, II, 559.



plans were formulated for a general conference on peace. Anganamon had requested the evacuation of the forts of Paicavi and of Arauco as essential provisions in a peace settlement; the first was promised without reservation, and the second was to be accomplished after the negotiations had come to a definite conclusive treaty.<sup>31</sup>

Anganamon departed. Meanwhile, three of his wives, with two of his children, escaped to the fort of Paicavi. Anganamon, upon hearing of this, communicated immediately with the Spaniards. As he was impatiently awaiting a reply, a meeting of theologians and jurists convened to settle the difficulty. The question was a vexing one. Would a return of the wives be equivalent to sanctioning polygamy? It was decided that Anganamon be given his choice among his wives, be reduced to Christianity, and contract a legal marriage in the Church. The decision angered the infidel chief, who understood only that these Christian Spaniards were refusing to return his property.

Meanwhile, other incidents occurred which revived the hope of a satisfactory peace negotiation. There came to Valdivia the septagenarian Utilflame, a *toqui* of import, who hitherto had been one of the most hostile rebels. Valdivia's gentle treatment so touched the haughty chief, that he turned his powers of influence toward averting bloodshed in an uprising against the intruders and toward mediation between his people of Ilicura and the Spaniards. Numerous *toquis* of Puren followed the example of their neighbors from Ilicura. So it was that Valdivia and the governor witnessed a peaceful congregation composed largely of recently most rabid enemies of the Spaniards. Striking the keynote of the discussion, Utilflame delivered an oration warmly advocating peaceful settlement. He asked the Spaniards to quit the fort of Paicavi, and to send padres to evangelize his people, while excluding the military and civil men, whose *entradas*, regardless of their intention, still kindled suspicion in the minds of the natives. Cognizant of the bitterness the incident was provoking, he advocated more lenient terms to Anganamon. With the promise to have the fort quitted, Valdivia further agreed with Utilflame that Anganamon should not be antagonized beyond endurance, though Christian standards could not be forsaken. An exchange of compacts followed, especially one to continue these preliminaries to permanent peace. The remarkable

<sup>31</sup> C. H., VIII, 292, 296; Rosales, II, 561-562; Molina, II, 267-268; Barros Arana, *Historia*, IV, 57.

junta which, due to the Black Robes, witnessed words instead of war between former most bitter enemies, drew to a close.<sup>32</sup>

That night, December 7, 1612, an atmosphere of unrest permeated the camp. The officers were dubious. Valdivia prayed for many hours during the night that he might act prudently. The following day he ordered the demolition of Paicavi; he prepared to send two padres to seek out Anganamón in order to give full explanations of points discussed the day before, and in order to comply with the requests for padres made by the *toquis* of Puren. Work began immediately upon the destruction of the fort of Paicavi. Ribera retired to Arauco with his army; Valdivia remained in the fort of Lebu, which after the demolition of Paicavi served as the most useful outpost on the new line of frontier.<sup>33</sup>

Fears were enunciated concerning the intended entrance of the fathers into Anganamón's hostile land. Despite the opposition, Valdivia deemed it wisest to comply with the requests of the *toquis* from Ilicura and from Puren, lest the Indians be aroused to doubt the good faith of the Jesuits. Barros Arana has referred to the *entrada* of the padres as "utter folly."<sup>34</sup> He failed to take into account that the harvesting of souls of the infidels was their primary mission in the New World, and that such an undertaking necessitated obvious risks. Fathers Vecchi and Aranda, and the brother coadjutor Diego de Montalbán, were selected for this dangerous mission. Accompanying them was the influential Utilflame and the *toqui* Painequil. But Anganamón was in a savage mood. With one hundred Indians of Pellabuen, he descended upon them, slaying the group without awaiting an explanation of their mission.<sup>35</sup>

#### IV

Those in opposition to *guerra defensiva* had been awaiting just such an indication of its fatuity. The protestations of the *caciques* of Puren and Ilicura that this crime was not of their doing, indeed, the repudiation of the deed by many of the hundred of Anganamón's ranks, unsympathetic with the murders, fell upon deaf ears. Forgotten was the fact that within the short period of eight months under the direction of Valdivia peace had

<sup>32</sup> Valdivia's *Relations*, MS.; Molina, II, 268-269; Barros Arana, *Historia*, IV, 57; C. H., VIII, 297-299; Rosales, II, 370-371, 378.

<sup>33</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia*, IV, 59, 65.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, 63-65.

<sup>35</sup> Valdivia's *Relations*, MS.; Matias Tanner, S. J., *Societas Iesu usque ad sanguinem . . .*, Rome, 1665, 464.

been established among the recent rebels of Arauco, among the inhabitants of Catiray who had been most fierce in their opposition, and among those of Monterrey who had previously displayed successful resistance to all military force. Forgotten by opponents to the plan were all the *toquis* of Puren and Ilicura, save Anganamon, whom they typified as the native. *Cédulas* which still authorized the special civil, military, and ecclesiastical authority of Valdivia were ignored. Governor Ribera soon discarded the qualities attributed to him by Valdivia when the padre had spoken for him as governor. Before the year 1613 drew to a close the governor had directed twenty-two military expeditions. Anganamon grasped his opportunity in these hostile Spanish *entradas* to vindicate his actions, and both the tribes of Imperial and of Puren were pitched to new depths of hatred and distrust of the Spaniards.<sup>36</sup>

Valdivia meantime traveled in desperation from *toqui* to *toqui*, trying to salvage the accomplishments achieved prior to this outburst. Under the prevalent most difficult circumstances it seemed quite impossible to convey any impression that he still held his official capacity and that regardless of contrary demonstrations of the governor, the king desired the plan of *guerra defensiva* to be effective. Resentful of the authority possessed by Valdivia, which, though little respected, was still official, Governor Ribera wrote to Felipe III requesting a limitation of the jurisdiction of the padre.<sup>37</sup>

Valdivia, Torres, the Society itself, were caught in a wave of public animosity. The *ayuntamientos* of Santiago and of Concepción sent joint *memorials* to the king voicing common indignation towards the entire plan fostered by the Jesuit. While ample discussion has been devoted to the more pragmatically motivated group in opposition to Valdivia, there was another minority group far more sincere in its protestations. The majority of Dominicans, Franciscans, and Augustinians had been persuaded by the testimony of the soldiers who, having engaged in combat with the fierce Araucanians, had concluded that men of so savage a nature could only be subdued by armed force. In their protestations against *guerra defensiva*, with its consequent ban upon personal service, the *cabildos* of La Serena, Santiago, and Concepción appointed the guardian of the convent of San Francisco, Fray Pedro de Sosa, to present their case to Felipe

<sup>36</sup> Valdivia's *Relations*, MS.; C. H., XXIX, 20; Rosales, II, 593.

<sup>37</sup> Astrain, IV, 721, 724.

III. Fray Pedro recently had been devoting his sermons to denunciations of Padre Valdivia's activities, intermingling personal accusations against the padre although he was unable to substantiate such libelous statements. So serious had his accusations become that the *oidores* found it necessary to ban such discussions being given from the pulpit. Fray Pedro was sent to Spain with the sanction of Ribera, and Colonel Pedro Cortés was dispatched by the army men to represent their grievances against *guerra defensiva*. The two embarked for Spain in April 1613. Valdivia sent Father Melchor Venegas to defend his case in Peru, and to Madrid he sent his close companion, Gaspar Sobrino.<sup>38</sup>

While Valdivia was vainly attempting to stop the flow of weapons streaming under Ribera's orders,<sup>39</sup> a war of words ensued in Peru and Spain. For two years, from 1614 to 1616, the heated debate continued.<sup>40</sup> Cortés attributed all Chile's existing difficulties to the eight month experiment of *guerra defensiva*; despite the fact that Chile had been suffering acutely for over seventy years while *guerra ofensiva* was the sole policy. He enumerated an impressive list of damages inflicted by the natives; in order to prevent further damage he asked Spain for large military reinforcements and more weapons of war. Emphasizing the savage state of the natives, he added that it was quite impossible to retain their respect for the soldier under the humiliating leniency required in *guerra defensiva*. Far more difficult to hurdle was the argument presented by Fray Pedro de Sosa. Fray Pedro branded defensive warfare as not only ineffectual, but in its execution certain to place the Spaniards in actual danger, since defensive action would invite invasion by the Araucanians. It was essential to continue consistently a military move southward through Araucanian territory; otherwise, the Araucanians would take the initiative and resume their perennial attacks northward throughout Spanish lands. He scoffed at the possibility of attaining a static position with the Bío-Bío as a dividing line. He was disinclined to inconvenience the *encomenderos*, whom he hailed as preservers of the peace and bulwarks of society, by forcing them to suffer the consequences of the

<sup>38</sup> C. H., XXIV, 387-388, 400, 412; C. H., XXIX, 21-22; Medina, *Biblioteca Hispano-Chilena*, II, 155; Astrain, IV, 723-724; Amunátegui, *Las Encomiendas*, I, 384.

<sup>39</sup> Rosales, II, 596.

<sup>40</sup> The various memorials presenting the arguments of the participants in these debates are printed in Medina, *Biblioteca Hispano-Chilena*, II, 123-208.



abolition of personal service. Besides, the Indians could only adequately satisfy their obligation of tribute to the Crown by paying such personal service. Only through personal service could the Indian be taught obedience to the kingdom of Spain and fidelity to the Faith. He attributed the rebellion of the Indians not to abusive treatment, but to their violent and savage nature. When the sword had cut away these evil characteristics, then would the path be clear for the cross. He argued that should the Araucanians be given such freedom as fostered by Valdivia they would abuse the liberty by reverting to their savage pattern of life, menacing all development of civilization and conversion of Chile. Focusing attention upon the failures of the Franciscans and the Mercedarians among the natives, he was extremely skeptical that another order could accomplish what these zealous friars failed to do. To disprove a claim of accomplishment and good will, he, too, referred to the martyrdoms of the Jesuits at the hands of Anganamón. To rid the land of the more bellicose Indians he favored their deportation to Peru.

In defense of the official though much transgressed policy of *guerra defensiva*, Father Sobrino stated that according to Christian ethics it was the only desirable or permissible method of pacification. He refused to admit that the means adopted, of slavery and the sword, could justify the end sought, which was peace. During many years both had proved ineffective in attaining spiritual or temporal gain. Aside from the religious implications, he recalled that Padre Valdivia, through his methods, established peace in the hitherto rebellious Arauco, Tucapel, and Catiray. Previous to the martyrdoms remarkable progress had also been made in Ilicura and even Puren. He regretted that the one incident, the slaying of the Jesuits by one enraged *toqui* with a comparatively small following, should be interpreted as a universal uprising against which the Spaniards should have displayed such vigorous vindictiveness. Sobrino spoke realistically of the defects in the character and morality of the Araucanians; however, he insisted that they were not hopelessly degenerate, but rather ignorant. Valdivia, he related, had traveled extensively in the hostile land, accompanied most frequently by but a single soldier, reducing many natives to peace. Sobrino, who had also labored among these Araucanians, had witnessed evidence sufficient to convince him of the plausibility, advisability, and practicability of *guerra defensiva*, if given a sufficient trial.

One factor bearing upon the authority of the debaters lay in the point that Fray Pedro, who had spoken so strongly concerning the nature of the natives, had personally resided but a brief while in Chile, during which time he had remained in Santiago among the Spaniards, rarely coming in contact with the Indians of the vicinity, and never with those farther removed, whereas Sobrino had lived among these tribes, depended upon them as guides and friends, and traveled far into their lands with Valdivia, who possessed a richer fund of direct knowledge concerning the Araucanians than any or all of his opponents combined.

Impressed by the logic of Sobrino, the Council of the Indies and the king found no sufficient motive to discontinue *guerra defensiva*. Thus, on November 21, 1615, Felipe III issued a *cédula* directing the continuance of the policy. Following this *cédula*, January 3, 1616, he sent a letter voicing his approval of Padre Valdivia's efforts.<sup>41</sup> On paper, Valdivia had won his point. Yet Chile was a good distance from the king and Spain; the royal *cédulas* and sanctions were to be disregarded.

Valdivia was helpless in preventing the unofficial and unauthorized resumption of offensive hostilities. Regardless of the injustices against themselves, many natives who had been reduced by Valdivia and his companions retained an allegiance to the Spaniards to the extent of engaging in battles against rebellious Indian tribes. The allegiance of the pacified Indians, however, could not balance the loss of trust of the undecided natives who had been bordering upon a peaceful settlement but who had violently retreated from such considerations after witnessing the governor's repudiation by action of his verbal promises.

Alonso de Ribera had contradicted the orders of the viceroy and the king by scoffing at the authority of Valdivia. He had made unfriendly excursions into enemy territory. He had prohibited Jesuits from entering the rebellious land, while he supervised further enslavement of the natives. With far less success was Valdivia able to combat the hostility of the Spanish opposition than that of the infidel Indian. Nor did indignation apply only to Valdivia personally; the Society to which he belonged was involved. The interference of the Society in behalf of the natives had struck fear and anger in the hearts of soldier and *encomendero*, who cried that matters such as labor should re-

<sup>41</sup> Astrain, V, 627; Enrich, I, 317.

main in the hands of the military and civil authorities; let the padres concern themselves only with religious matters.<sup>42</sup>

In January 1617, Sobrino arrived in Lima, bearing dispatches of the king and Council of the Indies which approved the continuance of *guerra defensiva*. The recently appointed viceroy, Principe de Esquilache, was, as had been his predecessors, in accord with the instructions to carry on in the attempts to establish peace through this system. Sobrino departed from Lima for Chile, where in March he delivered the royal orders. In essence these provided that: (1) the governor of Chile must prosecute only defensive war; (2) Valdivia alone should interpret the definition of defensive warfare; (3) the padres should pacify the Indians; (4) the governor should at all times comply with the regulations of Padre Valdivia in regard to the natives; (5) as many religious as Padre Valdivia judged necessary were to enter the Araucanian territory; (6) missions should be established wherever Padre Valdivia deemed wisest; (7) the viceroy of Peru should name a *visitador general* to inquire regarding the adherence given these regulations in Chile; (8) Spanish soldiers or tradesmen were to be banned from Araucanian territory; (9) all prisoners of war agreeing to abide by the principles of *guerra defensiva* should be released; (10) all prisoners captured in the future should be held in custody with the object of exchanging them for Spanish captives. The viceroy had appointed the fiscal of the Audiencia of Lima, Fernando Machado, *visitador* to report the obedience given these commands.<sup>43</sup>

Meanwhile, Ribera had passed away, and was succeeded temporarily in the governorship by Licentiate Fernando Talaverano Gallegos, *oidor* of the Royal Audiencia of Santiago. Without delay he hastened to the frontier to review the situation, giving particular attention to the *estados* of Arauco and Yumbel, where he communicated directly with numerous natives. Though formerly he had displayed indications of a disapproval of *guerra defensiva*, he now evidenced his intention to give full cooperation to Valdivia. With this attitude on the part of Talaverano, and subsequently on the part of his successor, Valdivia once again picked up the gnarled threads of his former achievements. He again sent messages throughout the lands announcing the resumption of cordiality of the new governor and repeating the

<sup>42</sup> Rosales, II, 604-605, 607; Enrich, I, 277-278; Astrain, IV, 721-722; Amunátegui, *Las Encomiendas*, I, 389.

<sup>43</sup> Astrain, V, 628, 629, 638; Rosales, II, 622-625; Medina, *Biblioteca Hispano-Chilena*, I, 185-187; Amunátegui, *Las Encomiendas*, I, 389-390.

often uttered desire for peace. To substantiate these messages Valdivia declared free all those Indians who had been held in captivity during "Ribera's war." Jubilantly the padre received replies indicative of a willingness on the part of the natives to attempt again peace negotiations. *Toquis* from the cordilleras visited him at Nacimiento revealing that despite the unpleasantness which had intervened, they still retained a confidence in his kind of peace. On the frontier of Arauco, and similarly on that of Yumbel, thousands of Indians received the sacrament of Baptism. Christian marriages were contracted. Instruction in the Faith was avidly sought. The zeal of the Jesuits was bearing bountiful fruit.<sup>44</sup>

Twelve *caciques* sought Valdivia in Santa Fé to deliver a welcome message: in Puren and the neighboring territory the majority of *toquis* and natives, contrary to Tureulipe and Anganamón, were anxious to discuss terms of peace with the padre. At a large council held the previous October 5, on the site of Lleolleo, the *caciques* and *toquis* of the provinces of Ayllareguas or Puren had reached the decision to secure peace based upon the suggestions of Valdivia. Thus they had been sent not only as messengers, but as plenipotentiaries empowered to negotiate peace with Valdivia and Governor Talaverano.

Delighted with their message, Valdivia promised in the name of the king that there should be no transgression of the soldiers or civilians within their territory; reciprocally, they were to respect the Spanish lands. To prevent possible difficulty and still permit a degree of commercial activity, the natives were to limit their trade route to a certain path to Nacimiento, and were to enter only when they possessed a license issued by the captain of the fort. Further arrangements provided for an exchange of prisoners of war; a non-interference pact was agreed upon whereby neither Spaniard nor Indian was to interfere in the internal disagreements of the other.<sup>45</sup>

Valdivia was ever on the alert to improve conditions within the ranks of the natives. He organized a patrol of the finest Indian warriors to prevent the native highwaymen from entering Spanish land and to serve as a guard within their own borders. Especially serviceable were these squads in Puren. The natives gave enthusiastic support to this innovation. They had cooperated very little with the former *toquis* Anganamón and Tureulipe;

<sup>44</sup> Rosales, II, 619-629.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 631-633.



now they were willing to organize to rid their territory of the harm wrought by these members of their tribe. Even the *toquis* of Pellagien, where Anganamón had previously managed to solicit followers, denounced him, following Pelantara instead in paths of peace. They consulted the padre to determine the most suitable punishment that should be pronounced against Anganamón, who had rebelled not only against the Spaniards but against all the *toquis* of the vicinity when they had expressed a desire for peace. Valdivia was far less harsh in his judgment than were Anganamón's former companions. He pardoned the *toqui* of all his misdeeds, citing in particular, the murder of the Jesuits. Thus did he hope to convince Anganamón of the existence of the Christian virtue of charity. Anganamón could not disband his fear of punishment for his crime. He could not believe that this message was anything but a hoax in order to seize him for retaliation.<sup>46</sup>

In January 1618, the viceroy chose as successor to Ribera, Don Lope de Ulloa y Lemos. Concentrating his attention upon the frontier problem, the new governor cooperated fully with Padre Valdivia. Under the instructions of Valdivia, he depopulated the fort of San Jerónimo. He settled the *torren* of San Ignacio, congregating there Indians of Cayuguanu that they might be protected by Spanish arms. Defensive forts were established in Talcamavida, while those along the cordillera from San Lupercia and Santa Elena were abandoned. Padre Valdivia once more was rapidly achieving success, overcoming the enormous disadvantages caused by the devastation growing out of Ribera's belligerency.<sup>47</sup>

The new governor did not acquire any popularity in his efforts to comply with the instructions of the viceroy. He angered the *encomenderos*; in a letter dated May 20, 1618, Ulloa y Lemos wrote that he did not have eight friends in the entire territory of Chile. The *cabildo* of Santiago, composed mainly of *encomenderos*, resorted to active measures to renounce the abolition of personal service. Unsuccessful in moving the governor by arguments that had been expounded and refuted since Valdivia first introduced his system, the *cabildo* again determined to report to the king the miserable failure of *guerra defensiva*. After dispatching a *cabildo* member to the frontier to substantiate its claims, it was disappointed to learn of the notable progress being

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 633-637.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 638-640; Amunátegui, *Las Encomiendas*, I, 393.

achieved from Chilean to Concepción. The members were forced to alter their mode of attack. In the latter part of August an open *cabildo* was arranged. At this gathering a decision to organize thoroughly against the abolition of personal service was enacted. During a following session the motion was adopted to communicate with all the *corregidores* of the bishopric of Santiago in order to swell the already impressive list of official objectors. Aware of the organized enmity of the *cabildo* of Santiago, Valdivia bluntly denounced its activities. Immediate reaction to this was the charge that he was attempting to take Chile completely under control.<sup>48</sup>

Valdivia, ceaseless in his activities in behalf of the Araucanians, had accumulated a harvest of animosity among the Spaniards in Chile. Though he had labored splendidly, blazing a spiritual path among the natives, his work could be carried on by others. At this juncture his very presence in Chile was thought by some of his fellow Jesuits to serve only as further aggravation of the Spaniards towards the Society. Some saw no necessity for such wide jurisdiction as Valdivia possessed, among them the successor of Aquaviva in the generalate, Mutius Vitelleschi. In a letter dated April 30, 1619, Vitelleschi placed Valdivia under the supervision of the provincial of Paraguay.<sup>49</sup>

In March 1619, Valdivia proposed to go to Spain in order to report his progress to the king. At the moment he was enjoying increased success among the natives in their own territory. The Bío-Bío border was respected by the governor, Ulloa. It was north of the Bío-Bío that *guerra defensiva* was defeated. The abolition of the abuses of personal service—one of the primary requisites of the system—was impeded at every turn by the *encomenderos* and the soldiers. Efforts to remove the Indians from Spanish exploitation even brought upon the Jesuits the accusation that they were merely trying to dissemble their own attempts to exclusive exploitation of the natives.<sup>50</sup>

To resolve all these elements into their unhappy climax, Valdivia was confronted with another enemy—his own discouragement. He sailed for Lima in November of 1619, never to return to Chile and his Araucanians. In a letter to the king, written November 3, 1619, Valdivia excused his departure with the com-

<sup>48</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia*, IV, 138-139; *C. H.*, XXV, 254-255, 281-290, 356-357; *C. H.*, XXVIII, 74; Amunátegui, *Las Encomiendas*, I, 396, 398-399; Astrain, V, 630; Medina, *Biblioteca Hispano-Chilena*, II, 220.

<sup>49</sup> Astrain, V, 630-631, 636-637.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, V, 637.

plaint that after his many years of labor among the Indians he had withstood tremendous opposition, even mendacious testimony against his character; now he could bear no further insult. He remained in Lima about five months, and in the summer of 1620, he departed for Spain.<sup>51</sup>

In view of the padre's civil obligations, and the interest of the king in the Chilean situation, he reported to the Crown, and discussed the affair before the Council. This mission concluded, Vitelleschi, on August 30, 1621, assigned Father Valdivia to the college of Valladolid, where he became prefect of studies. After the storm had passed, Vitelleschi assured him that the charges and subsequent investigations endured by him in no way reflected upon his noble efforts or impaired his reputation in the Society. For twenty years he conscientiously discharged his duties at Valladolid.<sup>52</sup>

## V

Upon his departure from Chile Valdivia had obtained the promise of Governor Ulloa y Lemos to continue his efforts to prosecute *guerra defensiva*. Nevertheless, Ulloa left no evidence of achievement in this regard when he died in December 1620. The policy of his successor in the governorship, Cristóbal de la Cerda, was even more disheartening in this regard.

Mention should be given the *Tasa de Esquilache*, not because it was effective, but because it was a typical failure. This plan to ban obligatory service, requiring in substitution a monetary tribute, was formulated by the viceroy, Principe de Esquilache, under the guidance of Valdivia. It was submitted to the king March 28, 1620; on the 8th of December, 1622, it received royal recognition. The purpose of the *Tasa* was to free the natives of all expense that was necessary to maintain defensive garrisons for their own protection. Like all other efforts to prevent Indian servitude, this also met with the powerful local opposition of the *encomenderos*. The octogenarian successor of Ulloa y Lemos, Pedro Osoreo de Ulloa, had been delegated to represent the undesirable limitations of the *Tasa* to the Council and king. He was in theoretical accord with the plan of Valdivia, though he was convinced of the impossibility of its practical application. With the proposal to reform the abuses existant in the contemporary infliction of personal service, he received the approval of numer-

<sup>51</sup> Rosales, II, 619; Astrain, V, 637-639, 640-643, 696-704.

<sup>52</sup> Astrain, V, 643-646; Domingo Amunátegui y Solar, *Jesuitas, Gobernantes, Militares y Escritores*, Santiago, 1934, 33.

ous influential ecclesiastics of Spain. As indicated, the *Tasa de Esquilache* sank into the oblivion of defeat.<sup>53</sup>

The last ember of Valdivia's achievements was stamped out on January 24, 1626. On that date the royal *cédula* of Felipe IV was publicly proclaimed by Luis Fernández de Córdova declaring the official termination of the policy of *guerra defensiva*.<sup>54</sup> Valdivia heard the official pronouncements of the failure. He knew of the continued slaveholding and slavetrading policy of the *encomenderos* and soldiers. He saw the triumph of the enemies of defensive, as opposed to offensive, Indian war in Chile. His death, November 5, 1642, closed the sequel of his existence; his departure from Chile twenty-three years previously had closed the chapter of his life among the Araucanians.

The defeat of *guerra defensiva* was a defeat socially, economically, and religiously of Spanish progress in Chile. Continual warfare resulted in a developed sense of insecurity detrimental to colonial morale. True, a treaty of 1641 conceded all lands south of the Bío-Bío to the Araucanians. Eventually, cessation of hostilities was to be effected only by a pact recognizing the Araucanians as an independent nation in 1881, thus ending "a conflict which might well be called the Three Hundred and Forty Years' War."<sup>55</sup> The animosity evidenced towards the Jesuits during Valdivia's crusade for *guerra defensiva* was not to decrease; it was inspired in great part by economic factors influential in the expulsion of the Jesuits from the Spanish dominions in 1767. As for Valdivia, his noble work, in advance of his times, has long been vindicated, and the very mention of his name in Chile today suggests a single title: "Protector of the Araucanians."

BEATRICE BLUM

Graduate School  
Loyola University

<sup>53</sup> Medina, *Biblioteca Hispano-Chilena*, I, 134-167; Amunátegui, *Las Encomiendas*, I, 411-425, 430-436, 443-445.

<sup>54</sup> *C. H.*, II, 210-213.

<sup>55</sup> Charles E. Chapman, *Colonial Hispanic America*, New York, 1933, 61.



## Notes and Comment

### BOOKS

Professor Kenneth S. Latourette of Yale University has completed the fourth volume of his *A History of the Expansion of Christianity*, published by Harper and Brothers, New York. This section of the eight-volume undertaking is devoted chiefly to the history of various Christian denominations in the United States for the hundred years preceding the first World War. Other volumes by the scholarly writer are to trace the progress of Christianity as it took root and developed on the continents of South America, Australia, Asia, and Africa. Anyone may tabulate the difficulties, the drawbacks, and the good points of a work of such tremendous scope. Some might consider that a project of the kind would of its nature develop only into "something to shoot at." But Professor Latourette has gone far beyond expectations in arranging his synthesis within the confines of limited space. The benefits to readers and scholars in this case will far outweigh the defects for which the author apologizes, and the fair-mindedness of the approach and the good bibliography will do much to make critics forget the several errors of interpretation and omission with respect to details of history and dogma.

American Council on Public Affairs, Washington, D. C., published in 1941 *The Economic Defense of the Western Hemisphere: A Study in Conflicts*. This is a symposium of the Latin American Economic Institute, with contributions by authorities, on the economic problems which have arisen as a result of the present World War. The papers are devoted to "The Influences of the Second World War," "Canada as an American Problem," "Inter-American Collaboration," "A Businessman's Program," "The Totalitarian Aggressors," "Britain's Rivalry," "Brazil's Nationalist Economy," and "Some Basic Considerations." These studies should be read with great profit by anyone interested in our future economic program; they may be studied well by many professors of history and economics.

*An Historical Sketch of St. Joseph's Parish*, by Reverend Joseph I. Hartmann, was published at Maumee, Ohio, last year. This brochure of seventy-seven pages traces the development of Maumee and its old parish over the years 1841 to 1941. The historical significance of the Ohio area centered around Maumee is traced in a preface article, "The Maumee Valley, One of the Keys to the Continent," by Edward J. Eggl. Father Hartmann has amplified his graphic account of St. Joseph's with a map, facsimiles, and photographic illustrations.

Attention should be called here to a readable and informative little

book about an important Catholic priest of French Revolutionary times. This is *The Curé of Ruillé*, a sketch of the Very Reverend Francis Dujarié, founder of the Sisters of Providence, well-known teaching order of the United States, and of the Brothers of Saint Joseph of Ruillé. The book is by Brother Ephrem, C. S. C., and it is published by Ave Maria Press, Notre Dame, Indiana.

*Washington: A Guide to the Evergreen State*, compiled by writers of the Works Progress Administration under the sponsorship of the Washington State Historical Society, appeared in 1941. This completes the American Guide Series prepared by the WPA. There is now a long shelf of volumes, some of which are remarkable for historical inaccuracies and others of which, more carefully supervised and checked, are well worthy of the national effort and expenditures required in the production of the series. Already, histories of cities and localities have appeared as enlargements of the more general works.

Much historical writing is being centered about the rivers and their valleys throughout the United States. No one can gainsay the importance of many of the waterways in the development of our social, political, and economic life. Rivers and their valleys are obvious focal points for studies of history; around them have gathered lore, songs, and stories. It is not surprising then that the Rivers of America Series of books was begun. The newest addition to this series is *The Charles*, by Arthur B. Tourtellot, published by Farrar and Rinehart.

Following the same approach the State Historical Society of Iowa published *Iowa: Her Rivers and Her Valleys*, by William J. Petersen. This, one of a series of books commemorating the establishment of the state in 1846, describes what transpired in the basin of each of the streams of Iowa.

Under the general editorship of Lawrence K. Fox, the State Historical Society of South Dakota has issued the nineteenth volume of *South Dakota Historical Collections*. The volume consists of three sections: "First Journey to North America," by Paul Wilhelm, Duke of Wuerttemberg, translated by William G. Bek, pp. 7-463; "Supplementary Material Relating to Prince Paul"; and "Dakota, An Autobiography of a Cowman," by W. H. Hamilton, pp. 475-638.

Just a few months off the press is an important technical manual by J. Villasana Haggard and Malcolm D. McLean, entitled *Handbook for Translators of Spanish Historical Documents*, Archives Collection, The University of Texas, 1941, pp. vii, 198. Published under the auspices of the Institute of Latin American Studies, it fills a long felt need. It is divided into five chapters: Theory, Paleography, Procedure of Translation, Special Aids, and Transcription. Three appendixes contain specimen documents with transcriptions and translations, specimens of handwriting, and pertinent lists of manuscript alphabet.

In the chapter on special aids a few improvements by way of expansion could be made in the lists of standardized and special expressions, and in the list of symbols on page 67, with a more balanced representation for each of the three centuries of the colonial period. The volume will be especially useful to students of the history of New Spain and its outlying provinces. The above suggestions do not detract in the least from this brilliant and extremely useful little book. It cannot be too highly recommended to those engaged in the translation of Spanish documents into English.

Miguel Cascón, S. J., has made a valuable contribution to the study of Spanish intellectual history through the publication of his scholarly volume *Los Jesuitas en Menéndez Pelayo*, Valladolid, 1940, pp. 613. The volume surveys the broad story of Spanish Jesuit contributions to science, scholarship, literature, and general culture. About one-third of the work is devoted to the eighteenth century. It should be of special interest to students of eighteenth-century Spanish American intellectual history.

#### PERIODICALS

*The Wisconsin Magazine of History*, December 1941, has an article "John Hagen, Eminent European Astronomer, Sojourns in Wisconsin," by W. B. Faherty. In this, Father Hagen's astronomical work at Prairie du Chien, done in collaboration with the Washburn Observatory at Madison, is summarized. . . . The editors of *Social Science* dedicating January 1941 as Pan-American Number, printed articles pertinent to social problems of the southern republics. . . . The newly formed American Association for State and Local History is publishing an eight-page, bi-monthly named *The State and Local History News*. . . . A feature of *Missouri Historical Review*, January 1942, is Floyd C. Shoemaker's "St. Charles, City of Paradoxes." The little city near St. Louis recently celebrated the 150th anniversary of its naming. . . . The *Bulletins* of the National Archives, issued irregularly and distributed by the Administrative Secretary, The National Archives, Washington, D. C., offer exceedingly important instructions. Especially is this true of Number 3, December 1941, which consists of thirty pages on "The Care of Records in a National Emergency," a joint report of the Special Committees of the Society of American Archivists, on the protection and transfer of archives during the hazards of war. When, where, and how to evacuate valuable materials, methods of storage, and means of protection are discussed in detail.

## Book Reviews

*Henry de Tonty, Fur Trader of the Mississippi.* By Edmund Robert Murphy. (Institut Français de Washington.) The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1941. Pp. ix, 129.

This book is a first step toward correcting a mistaken impression which has arisen from the unbounded adulation of La Salle's panegyrists. From every point of view Tonti's achievements are comparable to those of La Salle and in some respects even superior to them. He was a better business man, and a more successful leader of men than the over-touted La Salle. As indicated in the subtitle, the book is not a full-length biography, but merely recounts Tonti's activities as a fur-trader.

It is doubtful if in preparing a more extensive biography of Tonti, anyone will manage to find much new material regarding the pioneer's early life. Mr. Murphy has given a unified presentation of the scattered and scanty information available concerning Tonti before his coming to America. For the quarter of a century from 1678 until 1704, the year of Tonti's death, the basic documentation for his career is to be found in his own writings, in the official correspondence, in the notarial registers, and in the council records. Most of what concerns Tonti in the notarial registers has been published by Pease and Werner. As for the council records—and the only ones are those of the Sovereign Council of Quebec—there are, in the 6,000 printed pages of the proceedings of this court, only two references to Henry Tonti, both of them indirect. With regard to the official correspondence, the documentation which is as yet unpublished will not substantially change the picture as far as Tonti himself is concerned, nor will it shed much new light on the fur-trade as a whole.

The date and place of Tonti's birth are not certain. As for the date of his death, all we know is that, as Mr. Murphy says, it occurred "shortly after September 6, 1704." A recent critic has objected to this date on the ground that Bienville's letter, cited by Mr. Murphy as evidence, was itself dated September 6, 1704, and hence that Tonti's death must have occurred previously. Bienville's mention of Tonti's death, however, occurs not in the letter itself, but in a postscript which reads as follows: "Since I had the honor of writing you this present letter two of my officers have died, Messrs. Levasseur and de Tonti. . . ." Mr. Murphy deserves further commendation for his intelligent use of some of the printed documentation. Thus, though admitting that he did not see the original of a document which he quotes from Pease and Werner (*Illinois Historical Collections*, XXIII, 396), he correctly surmised that the words "seigneur de Ville de Tonty," as printed



in the above cited publication should read "seigneur de *lille* de Tonty." That such an error of transcription should take place will not surprise anyone who has deciphered Tonti's crabbed handwriting. A study of the document itself leaves no room for doubt that the first letter of the word underscored is an initial small *l*, and not a capital *V*, for the same letter occurs as an unmistakable initial small *l* in several places in the same document. This fact which was flatly denied by a recent reviewer (*Journal of Southern History*, VII, 551-552) on the basis of a photostat of the document, is incontrovertible. The present reviewer is certain of it owing to a careful comparison of the document in question with two other holograph Tonti manuscripts published in MID-AMERICA a few years ago.

A noticeable shortcoming in the book under consideration is the recurrence of digressions; although Tonti took an active part in the campaign of 1687, a detailed narrative of this campaign in a book dealing with Tonti's activities as a fur-trader is a *hors-d'oeuvre* which could have been dispensed with, or at least the account of this campaign should have been given more briefly. A more serious shortcoming is the author's indiscriminate use of evidence. He often quotes from second or third hand modern writers instead of from the contemporary text which he had. On page 14, note 9, Mr. Murphy gives as evidence for the wounding of Tonti by the Iroquois in 1680, first, the narrative of Father Membré as translated by Shea out of Le Clercq's *Premier Etablissement de la Foy dans la Nouvelle France*. Le Clercq's narrative is of hardly any value as primary, independent evidence, since it is mostly made up of miscellaneous accounts, obviously doctored, which were extant in Le Clercq's time and which his editors attributed to various Recollect missionaries. Mr. Murphy's next authority is the *New Discovery*. The account of Tonti's wounding in this book was taken bodily out of Le Clercq by Hennepin. The third authority here cited is Bernou's "Relation des découvertes." This was written in Paris, and is a paraphrase of La Salle's letter, which Mr. Murphy puts last on his list of evidence: "See also, Margry II, 122-124." This last bit of evidence, so casually referred to is of a higher order than any of those previously mentioned; for La Salle's account is based on Tonti's own story of the affair. Of less value is Murphy's next authority, Frontenac's letter to the king. As for La Potherie, he is hardly an "authority" in any sense. Strangely enough, the author fails to quote in this connection a document which he had and which is the most authoritative evidence available: Tonti's memoir of 1684. He does quote Tonti's memoir of 1693, but apparently considers it less reliable than Le Clercq, Hennepin, and Bernou who are listed before it. That Tonti's first memoir, 1684, is a better authority than his second memoir, 1693, will readily be granted by those who take into consideration the quite natural tendency to embroider on one's experiences after a lapse of several years.

Somewhat in the same order is Mr. Murphy's use of Joutel. Instead of quoting the original French as found in Margry, he relies on a reprint of the English translation of De Michel's abridgment. A critical use of Joutel's unabridged evidence would have greatly improved the chapter entitled "The Broken Link with the Gulf and Other Liabilities." Some errors in names and in identification would thus have been avoided. For instance, the name of the Recollect Father is Anastase, Anastasius in English; the name of the Sulpician is Jean Cavelier, not Cavelier de la Salle. The title of nobility was granted to Robert Cavelier, to "his children and posterity, born and to be born in lawful wedlock," but not to his brother, who in fact never used the name "de la Salle." Hence the sentence on page 53 should read: "The visitors included Henri Joutel, the Abbé Jean Cavelier, a nephew of Cavelier, the Recollect Father Anastasius de Douay (*i. e.*, the town he came from, his family name is not known), and a young Parisian named Tessier."

Fort Prudhomme hardly deserves the name of "fort" and only lasted a week. It consisted, says Joutel, "suivant ce que Mr. de la salle nous dit qua un abatis de bois autour du campement que lon fit audit lieu pour attendre ledit prudhome." La Salle did not build a fort at Chicago in 1679; he did build, however, a redoubt at the mouth of the St. Joseph River in November of that year. Attention must be called to a consistent error in spelling. Throughout the book, we find "*engagées*" instead of "*engagés*"; these hired workers were not women, but men.

In calling attention to these errors and in making these suggestions regarding better use of evidence, the present reviewer is acting solely on the hope that what is here suggested may be helpful to Mr. Murphy in the production of the full-length biography of Tonti which it is his intention to write.

JEAN DELANGLEZ

Institute of Jesuit History

*Emigrés in the Wilderness.* By T. Wood Clarke. The Macmillan Company, New York, 1941. Pp. xvi, 247.

This volume is appropriately named. It deals for the most part with the French émigrés who settled in New York and Pennsylvania, during the latter eighteenth and early nineteenth century. Most of the material has been neglected by the so-called standard histories of the period. The author has made use of many secondary sources dealing with this interesting but far from well-known phase of early American history, and has employed pertinent source material. Of necessity he had to incorporate much for which he could scarcely vouch, but a definite effort is made to properly evaluate such documents. Regarding the involved case of Eleazar Williams, who claimed to be Louis XVII of France, the author brings historical criticism very definitely into

use in an effort to separate that which is historically true from that which is palpably false.

More or less typical of the settlements which were made in New York and France by the émigrés forced out of France by the Revolution or by Napoleon, was the one made at Asylum, in northern Pennsylvania. In the words of the author, "Strange indeed was the procession of settlers who soon began to arrive at the promised land of Asylum. In a colony where existence itself depended upon wresting a livelihood from the soil, not a single member had ever worked on a farm or knew the first principles of agriculture. While some of the settlers intended from the first to make America their permanent home, others of this little colony of nobles, soldiers, and priests hated the country which had harbored them in their distress, despised the American settlers in the neighborhood, and looked down on them in turn, and refused to adopt their customs or learn their language. These lived by themselves in their new home on the Susquehanna and dreamed of the time when they should return to their beloved France" (p. 66).

Although this rather general attitude upon the part of the émigrés precluded any permanent settlements, various important personages did visit the French villages. In 1794, Charles Maurice Talleyrand, formerly Bishop of Autun, visited America; in 1796, the Duke of Orleans, destined to ascend the French throne in 1830, as Louis Philippe, the Citizen King, visited his compatriots in this country; in 1815, Joseph Bonaparte, King of Naples and Spain, reached New York, and remained in this country until 1830. Meanwhile many lesser lights arrived, and the story of the lives lived, the homes built, and the plans developed by these émigrés make a rather fantastic story, but one which the author reduces to historical accuracy and truth.

After having dealt in some detail with the royalists, and then in a later era with the Bonapartists, the author devotes the third section of the book to the old historical question as to whether the dauphin, Louis XVII, died in the Temple, in Paris, or lived later in the eastern and middle-western part of this country as Eleazar Williams. He presents the evidence which has accumulated and although he apparently favors the view that Eleazar Williams was not the younger son of Louis XVI, he makes it clear that he considers the point still historically debatable.

Although the communities established did not flourish, several of our older families trace their American origin to the settlements dealt with in this account. Many pictures of the homes built in the communities described are included. An ample bibliography and a good index increase the utility of this interesting book.

PAUL KINIERY

Loyola University, Chicago

*The Trail of Death: Letters of Benjamin Marie Petit.* By Irving McKee. (Indiana Historical Society Publications, Vol. XIV, No. 1.) Indiana Historical Society, Indianapolis, 1941. Pp. 141.

Benjamin Marie Petit, native-born Frenchman from Rheims in France, accompanied Bishop Bruté of Vincennes on the latter's return to America in 1836 from a European trip. Ordained a priest the following year by Bruté, he ministered with remarkable devotion and zeal to the Potawatomi of Indiana until their expulsion from the state and forced migration to the West. He accompanied the Indians on their removal in the capacity of chaplain and reached with them their new reserve in the Upper Osage River country in what is now southeastern Kansas. Stricken there with a critical illness, he recovered sufficiently to attempt the return journey to his diocese. He died February 10, 1839, when he was only twenty-nine, at St. Louis.

Few episodes in American history are more tragic than the deportation of the Indiana Potawatomi by the state authorities in 1838, a measure which took toll of Father Petit's life and the lives of many of the Indians. The circumstances accompanying it are revealed in his letters, twenty-seven of them, all that are known to be extant, being edited in the present volume. To them are added a journal of his missionary activities in Indiana and extracts from his baptismal register. Some of the letters have already appeared in print in the French missionary journal, *Annales de l'Association de la Propagation de la Foi*; others are here published for the first time from originals in the chancery office of the diocese of Indianapolis, the Indian Office, Washington, and the depositaries. The journal is a document of interest for the religious history of Indiana in the eighteen-thirties. The editing has been done with care, an amount of accurate and informing data illustrative of the text being assembled in the footnotes.

Father Petit's correspondence is a welcome addition to the historiography of the pioneer West. It brings into view for public edification a hitherto little known figure of unusual interest and charm and is one proof more that other influences besides economic ones were at work in the frontier movement.

GILBERT J. GARRAGHAN

Loyola University, Chicago

*Norway Neutral and Invaded.* By Haldvan Koht. The Macmillan Company, New York, 1941. Pp. 253.

Dr. Koht was Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway from 1935 to the time in February 1941 when he received the German ultimatum just after the Nazi invasion of his country. There can be no doubt about his qualifications to present this book, even though he had used no documents other than his notes for its composition. After sojourning in many lands he became professor of history in the University of



Oslo from 1908 to 1935. During this time he was visiting professor and lecturer in universities of continental Europe and America. His many books in Norwegian and English reveal him as a capable writer and are warrants for the academic honors bestowed on him: President of the Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters and President of the International Committee of Historical Sciences.

This volume, all too brief, will be considered as one of the documents of the present war, since it recounts the actions of a scholar and statesman high in the esteem of the people and government of Norway. From the viewpoint of the diplomat in charge of the foreign policy of his country he explains first why Norway was neutral at the outbreak of hostilities—and her inability to be otherwise. She, like other nations, still believed that international law existed. A graphic description of the phases of the Nazi invasion follows. He attributes the success to various and now obvious factors, lack of adequate defensive and offensive weapons, surprise, and foul play without and within the nation. Then follow sketches of his escape, the oppression in Norway, the flight of the king, the war of liberation being led by the exiled Norwegian government, and the programme of the Nazis under the arch-traitor Quisling.

The book might conceivably have received wide reading here had not the events of Pearl Harbor taken place a week after its publication.

JEROME V. JACOBSEN

Loyola University, Chicago

*The Jesuits in History. The Society of Jesus Through Four Centuries.*

By Martin P. Harney, S. J., M. A. The America Press, New York, 1941. Pp. xvi, 513.

This volume is required reading, as much for students of Jesuit history as for students of world history. Father Harney shows through his wide and oftentimes profound scholarship how the concept of a company of Christ's soldiers slowly evolved in the heart, brain, and soul of the founder, the Basque nobleman, Iñigo, of the house of Loyola. The founder's great wisdom, his insistence upon building solidly and painstakingly, are reasons given why the Company or Society of Jesus, later grew to be "one of the most numerous of the religious orders of the Catholic Church," and why members of the order planted the cross in foreign mission fields, became explorers, linguists, and ethnologists, and why also from its ranks have come "saints and martyrs, scholars and scientists, writers and orators" (p. ix). St. Ignatius was the fount, he conceived the idea of the order, he provided it with a system of asceticism (the *Spiritual Exercises*), he composed the *Constitution* for the company, and he laid the basis for the Jesuit system of education (the *Ratio Studiorum*, finally approved in 1599, after fifteen years of theoretical study and practical application).

Though the importance of the founder's work is forcibly presented, the author with equal force indicates how beautifully timed in an historical sense was the establishment of the Society of Jesus. The Protestant Revolution demanded a militant Catholic response. The Jesuits helped to provide this, both as ardent educational and religious missionaries working in Protestant and doubtful areas, and as valuable assistants to the progressive Catholic leaders who were accomplishing the internal reform of the Church.

The historical opportunities of the Jesuits were by no means confined to the conditions of the Protestant Revolution, however. There were new worlds to conquer. The missionary bent of the company is apparent from the first in Loyola's desire to convert the Turks to Christianity. Circumstances turned the missionary efforts of the Jesuits to other fields, the Western Hemisphere, Africa, and the Middle and Far East.

Two excellent chapters, "Gathering Storms," and "Cross Currents," describe the struggles of the Society against enemies who at length brought about its suppression by Pope Clement XIV in 1773. (Chapter XIII. Catastrophe.) In analyzing the difficult question, what was the reason for the suppression, Father Harney remarks that "The real cause of the warfare against the Jesuit order is to be found in the hatred of the Papacy and in the hatred of the Catholic Church itself" (p. 297). That is, hatred as expressed by Jansenists, Gallicans, and "certain regalistic and absolutistic Catholic politicians, whose persistent encroachments in the Church's domain had been fought by the Society. . . ." (p. 297). Added to these foes of the Jesuits was the school of French infidel philosophy.

Though suppressed, the life and organization of the Society was preserved without interruption in Russia, because no promulgation of the Brief of Suppression was ever allowed. Universal restoration of the Society was accomplished in 1814 by the Brief of Pope Pius VII.

Since the restoration, the Society has grown in strength until, in point of numbers (25,954 members in 1939), it is today more powerful than at any previous time in its history. Father Harney concludes his actual historical narrative in the period of the early 'thirties.

The volume is equipped with eleven pages of appendices containing documentary and statistical information pertaining to the history of the Society, a well organized bibliography, which seems quite complete despite the rather curious omission of Streit's important *Bibliotheca missionum*, and a very usable index. One could wish that this excellent work were equipped with maps, showing perhaps the areal distribution of the Society's membership in critical and peak periods of its history.

THEODORE E. TREUTLEIN

San Francisco State College